By Gabriel Vera Lopes on February 12, 2023
A review of the main milestones in U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba, two years into the Biden administration.
January 20 marked two years since the administration of Democrat Joe Biden arrived at the White House. Led by one of its most conservative wings, the Democratic Party returned to executive power with the promise and illusion of reversing the corrosive Trump era, which had produced -as well as being an expression- a series of ruptures and substantive modifications in U.S. political structures. Transformations that had their corollary in the takeover of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 and the refusal by Trumpism to accept its electoral defeat -a position they maintain to this day-.
During the presidential campaign, Biden harshly criticized the measures that his Republican opponent had been implementing against Cuba. He even went so far as to promise that, should he win, he would reverse Trump’s “failed policies that have harmed Cubans and their families.”
Although the policy towards the island is a daily part of the media debate in the United States, the fact is that in these presidential elections the discussion acquired a particular relevance, due to the different and zigzagging changes that had taken place in that matter. In just two administrations -Obama and then Trump- two notoriously different approaches were taken.
For more than five decades, the U.S. had maintained an unequivocal policy of open economic, media, judicial and even military hostility against Cuba. This policy, designed within the framework of the Cold War, remained essentially unchanged, despite certain modulations in its aggressiveness.
To this end, for years the White House had alleged that the blockade was a problem of “national security”. Arguing that the proximity of the small island, together with its strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, represented an important danger for the United States -the greatest military power in the world-. However, as long as the existence of the so-called “real socialism” was maintained in Eastern Europe, in a certain way the blockade found a relative counterweight that cushioned its most damaging isolation effects (commercial, diplomatic and political).
However, once the iron curtain -and with it the supposed threat to U.S. security- was dismantled, the blockade not only continued but deepened. It was after the dissolution of the Soviet Union that U.S. policy succeeded in generating significant damage and harm against the Cuban state and people. The Cuban Revolution was isolated from the world that the ideologues of imperialism called the “end of history”. What was known as “the special period” was beginning.
The economic depression of those years was particularly severe: the GDP contracted by 36% between 1990-93, with a slow recovery beginning in 1995. Twelve years had to pass before, only in 2007, the GDP levels recorded before the crisis were reached again. The maintenance of the blockade -and even more its intensification- under those conditions, was a full confession that this policy had nothing to do with a matter of national security, much less with the “defense of human rights” on the part of the United States. On the contrary, it was a policy aimed at inflicting on the population the highest possible level of suffering in order to encourage social unrest that would contribute to the much-vaunted “fall of the regime”.
However, in those years the achievements of the revolution were still very present among the Cuban population -both symbolically and materially-, which made possible an important capacity for social resilience. Material support for the expectation that the crisis would be just a moment which, once overcome, would return to the previous situation of prosperity. This capacity for resistance and adherence to the revolutionary ideology “from below” was combined with the enormous prestige of the political leadership of the process – headed by Fidel Castro – which maintained an iron strategic decision not to dismantle the revolution – “from above”. This situation made it possible for the process to be sustained, although not without suffering deep damages and setbacks.
At the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, with the arrival of the so-called “wave of progressive governments” in the continent, an unprecedented international period took place that allowed Cuba to emerge from the deep isolation to which it had been subjected. In this context, the Bolivarian process in Venezuela played a key role, based on a series of exchanges aimed at strengthening both experiences.
“In those years, the achievements of the revolution were still very present among the Cuban population -both symbolically and materially-, which made possible an important capacity for social resilience”.
This new context of greater Latin American unity and collaboration, together with the growing difficulties of the United States, due to its involvement in the Middle East and the 2008 crisis, generated a growing questioning of U.S. foreign policies towards the region. Sanctions against Cuba, based on Washington’s unilateral coercion, no longer achieved the silence – let alone the complicity – it had garnered in the 1990s among Latin American governments.
These changes in the balance of power allowed political factions within the Democratic Party, which advocated the need to recalibrate the relationship with Cuba, to acquire greater relevance. These positions were not about a strategic change in U.S. objectives-“the overthrow of the regime”-but rather a tactical change in the ways to implement this objective. These sectors harmonized with the neoliberal-progressive hegemonic articulation that underpinned the Obama administration, with its sort of pluralistic, inclusive and tolerant countenance of international law and civil rights.
During Barack Obama’s second term, several of the precepts of the policy against Cuba were reviewed and modified. He tried out a series of policies that reduced hostilities against Cuba and tended to reestablish dialogue and negotiations between Washington and Havana, although without dismantling the blockade.
Obama himself, in explaining this important tactical shift, stated:
“We will put an end to an approach that, for decades, has not allowed us to advance our interests and, therefore, we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries. With these changes, we intend to create more opportunities for the American and Cuban people and begin a new chapter between the nations of the Americas […] We can do more to help the people of Cuba and promote our values through engagement […] After all, these fifty years have shown that isolation has not worked. It’s time for a new approach.” (Obama, 2014)
On December 17, 2014, Barack Obama and Raúl Castro announced that, after 18 months of secret negotiations, they had agreed to begin what would be the opening of a new chapter in the relations between the two countries. This was the beginning of an unprecedented period in the history of both nations. Presidents and important religious and social leaders from all over the world greeted this new rapprochement with enthusiasm. For months it was one of the dominant topics in the international press, which called this period “thaw” (in a clear Soviet reference and displaying its lack of creativity).
Among the most important measures carried out were: the withdrawal of Cuba from the list of “Terrorist Sponsor Countries” -a list drawn up by the U.S. State Department and which included Cuba in 1982-, and the reestablishment of embassies in both countries.
It is worth noting, however, that this rapprochement did not constitute a reconstruction of U.S. foreign policy, as imagined by part of the progressive press at the time. It should be recalled that almost simultaneously with the “thaw” process, starting in 2015, a series of economic, financial and diplomatic actions against Venezuela intensified, seeking the removal of Chavism. To such an extent that, on March 8 of that year, Barack Obama signs Executive Order No. 13692 (“Obama Decree”), where he declares Venezuela as an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”, enabling a set of unilateral coercive measures against the South American country. These measures would be applied and accumulated in the following years, with the same logic that governs the blockade against Cuba: to strangle its economy and thus spread social unrest.
Despite the significant progress made during this period, the “thaw” with the Caribbean island did not last long. With the arrival of the Trump administration, the trials of rapprochement with Cuba were almost immediately reversed.
“It should be remembered that almost simultaneously with the “thaw” process, starting in 2015, a series of economic, financial and diplomatic actions against Venezuela intensified, seeking the removal of Chavism.”
In the city of Miami, shortly after taking office, Trump organizes an event at the Manuel Artime Theater. The choice of the venue was not only not random, but also carried with it a strong symbolism. The theater was named after the Chief of the emblematic Brigade 2506, which led the attempted invasion against Cuba in 1961, known as the Bay of Pigs invasion. In that act, Trump presented the “National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening U.S. Policy toward Cuba” that would mark the pulse of his policy toward the island.
His administration not only recomposed the set of measures that make up the blockade, but also significantly increased the unilateral coercive measures in force. He applied 243 new measures in addition to the already asphyxiating blockade. Leaving behind Obama’s strategy of engagement, to return once again to a policy of maximum pressure.
This situation became particularly dramatic during the global context of the COVID-19 pandemic -the time when most of these measures were applied. In the midst of the fight against the scourge that struck the world, Cuba not only saw the entry into the country of sanitary materials and tools to combat the pandemic blocked, but also the sanctions against the island increased day by day.
This increase in hostility against the island was driven by the same logic that marked the escalation of belligerence during the special period. That is to say, faced with a situation of widespread commotion and hardship, the intensification of sanctions sought to make the situation of social suffering unbearable and thus provoke the outbreak of the regime.
It was in this context that Biden’s campaign promises had managed to awaken, in broad progressive and democratic sectors, the hope that the policy of “thawing” with Cuba would be resumed. After all, Biden himself had served as Obama’s vice-president.
However, after assuming the presidency, Biden’s political team kept delaying the implementation of his campaign promises, arguing that the measures to be adopted were in a “study phase”.
Some of the reasons for this delay can be traced back to the tensions in U.S. domestic politics. Along with the strong rejection of the Republican opposition to a reestablishment of the dialogue with Cuba, there was an internal division within the Democratic ranks where no clear consensus was established on the matter.
A few weeks after Biden took office, on March 4, 2021, a group of 80 Democratic members of the House of Representatives drafted a letter urging the fragrant president to repeal the sanctions that former President Donald Trump had implemented against Cuba, calling them “cruel”. The response from the executive would be given five days later. At a press conference, when asked about the letter that the group of Democratic congressmen had prepared, the presidential spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, stated that “a change in policy towards Cuba is not currently among President Biden’s main priorities”.
Weeks later, the U.S. maintained its traditional rejection of what was expressed by the international community at the UN General Assembly held on June 23, 2021. With 184 votes in favor, three abstentions and the two traditional votes against -the United States and Israel- the resolution entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” was once again approved. For the twenty-ninth consecutive time, the US decided to violate international law and ignore the will of the vast majority of countries in the world in the name of “democracy and human rights”.
Only a few weeks later, the internal conflicts in Cuba began to play a considerable role in the maintenance of the policy of “maximum pressure” by the US. The July 11 protests in Cuba were used as a pretext by the US government to continue with the blockade policies against the island. As a result of this new conflict, Cuba went from not being among President Biden’s priorities to being one of his most important concerns in Washington’s government rhetoric.
The exit from the global pandemic gave rise to a growing social conflict throughout the world, giving rise to a cycle of global protests – as shown by several studies – which even had important episodes within the U.S. However, the Biden administration excused itself in the demonstrations on the island to maintain its policy of asphyxiation.
Once again, the conjecture was that the combination of the protests together with the destabilization and discomfort produced by the blockade could generate “regime change”. The preaching of human rights was once again instrumentalized by the US in favor of its imperialist interests.
However, government propaganda achieved little success in its justification. The social organization Black Lives Matter (BLM) published a communiqué on July 15 on its social networks demanding an end to the blockade of Cuba which, in its words, “was instituted with the explicit intention of destabilizing the country and undermining the right of Cubans to choose their own government.” In October, leaders of the World Council of Churches (WCC) sent a letter to President Biden urging him to make a “bold decision” to lift the financial and trade embargo on Cuba. And finally, in December, a hundred Democratic members of Congress resubmitted a letter to President Biden calling for: reestablishing dialogue with Cuba, addressing humanitarian needs, and moving toward normalization of relations with Havana. Biden thus ended the first year of his term without being able to unify a common position on his Cuba policy.
During 2022 there were few significant changes. This conservative attitude had several explanations.
First, externally, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, strongly pushed by the US, kept the foreign apparatus of the Biden administration focused on the construction of what would be the updating of the NATO “strategic concept”, which at its summit held in Madrid placed China and Russia as its main enemies.
Secondly, on the domestic front, rising domestic inflation, which reached its highest level in 40 years, coupled with Biden’s falling popularity ratings – the fastest decline in his image since World War II – led the administration to adopt, in an election year, a conservative Cuba policy.
However, after 17 long months of a “policy review”, during which the measures introduced by former President Donald Trump against Cuba remained intact, the State Department announced in May that it would relax some measures linked mainly to migration. Why was this announcement made?
On the one hand, the threat of several Latin American governments to boycott the IX Summit of the Americas if Cuba was excluded was a real embarrassment for U.S. foreign policy, showing once again that it would not be so easy to disengage from the “Cuba issue”. On the other hand, the worsening of the migratory crisis on the island and on the southern border of the United States forced the White House to recalibrate its migratory policy.
Cuba is currently experiencing a serious migration crisis. The combination of the covid-19 pandemic and the world economic crisis, together with the unprecedented tightening of the blockade, produced a severe economic recession on the island. For almost two years the country saw its main economic source -tourism- completely paralyzed while it made a gigantic fiscal effort to import inputs to combat the pandemic.
Once the sanitary restrictions were lifted, the country suffered -like the vast majority of countries in the world- a galloping inflationary process that further punished the population. According to official data, inflation rose by almost 40% in 2022. This harsh economic crisis, often combined with social unrest and a feeling of lack of expectations, produced a new wave of migration. In the last year, an estimated 270,000 people left the island.
Washington’s unilateral refusal to respect the migration agreements signed with Havana in 1994, instead of discouraging migration, led to an increase in migration through undocumented channels. The closing of consular offices and the elimination of regular flights caused many Cubans to opt for these alternative routes, which are extremely dangerous and inhumane for migrants. They often end up trapped in the middle of a mafia industry of tolls, mules and bribes built around the vulnerability caused by illegality.
There are many reasons why Cubans choose to migrate to the U.S. The first is the proximity of the Caribbean country to the U.S. coast. The second is that the state of Florida is already home to a huge community of more than 1.2 million Cubans or Cuban-Americans. This means that many people already have a relative, a friend or an acquaintance who facilitates their insertion. On the other hand, in the U.S. there is a whole series of laws that grant Cubans a series of advantages over other migrants. One of the most important is the “Cuban Adjustment Act”, which allows Cubans who have entered the country irregularly to become legal permanent residents after one year in the country. This legal architecture, which U.S. sociologist Susan Eckstein calls “the Cuban privilege”, is a policy that, paradoxically, aims to encourage irregular Cuban migration.
However, the exponential growth of irregular migration that the U.S. has received during the last year has generated a significant difficulty in controlling its border. This has forced the country to recalibrate its migration policy, allowing for greater openness to cooperation with Cuba.
This crisis is mainly centered on the border with Mexico. Thousands of migrants, subjected to all kinds of dangers and violence, try to cross every day. This situation had a political translation in the recent mid-term elections, being one of the most conflictive axes of debate for the Democratic Party. To the point that only a few days after the elections, the head of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Chris Magnus was forced to resign.
According to CBP reports, during 2022 that agency apprehended more than 2.7 million people attempting to cross the border. Almost one million more people than in 2021. A migratory wave that represents an exponential growth compared to the years prior to the pandemic. A phenomenon that has global characteristics, as became clear during last June’s NATO summit in Madrid where the organization – in a cynical manner – reinforced its war apparatus on Europe’s borders with Africa and the Middle East.
It was in this context that bilateral migration talks were resumed. The resumption of flights by U.S. airlines to the interior of the island was announced. Dialogue was resumed between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard Troops. And the resumption of the possibility of sending remittances was announced – although it has not yet been implemented. Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez describes as a “positive step” the resumption of the issuance of immigrant visas at the U.S. Embassy.
Despite these positive steps, at the end of the year, on December 2, the U.S. State Department presented its annual list of “countries that violate religious freedom” where Cuba was incorporated under the label of “countries of particular concern”. This makes it possible for the Caribbean country to be subject to possible new sanctions in addition to those that already weigh on the island. A policy with clear continuities with that of his predecessor Trump.
Halfway through his term, beyond some positive steps, Biden has not reversed the policies implemented by Trump against Cuba. However, the next few months will be key if Washington finally decides to ease sanctions and fulfill Biden’s campaign promise. As Cuban political scientist William Leogrande points out, the appointment of former Senator Christopher Dodd as Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas after the mid-term elections may be a step in that direction. Dodd has been an advocate of a change of strategy in the relationship with Cuba. However, the political decision will not depend solely on one official.
February 3 of this year marked 61 years since the United States began its blockade policy against the island with President John F. Kennedy’s Presidential Proclamation 3447. The objective of that measure was to punish the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro for its “alignment with the communist powers”, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, within the framework of the Cold War.
The plan had been meticulously studied by the U.S. government. The then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Lester D. Mallory, explained to his superior, in a memorandum dated April 6, 1960, the strategy that would be implemented against Cuba: “The only foreseeable means to subtract (Castro’s) domestic support is through disenchantment and disillusionment based on dissatisfaction and limitations. (…) we must take every measure to weaken economic life in Cuba (…) deny him funds and supplies to drive down wages and incomes and thus produce hunger, despair and the overthrow of the government.”
Since that time, the U.S. has undertaken a complex patchwork of laws and regulations made up of various economic, political, communicational, etc. sanctions. In 1996, the US Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act which states that the blockade should be maintained until Cuba “becomes a free market multi-party democracy and pays compensation for the properties nationalized by the Revolutionary Government”. In this way, the blockade can be understood as the modern equivalent of when in the Middle Ages an army besieged a city so that its population would starve to death and thus pressure its leaders to surrender.
The blockade policy is clearly in violation of international law. The UN declaration itself states that it is “the sovereign and inalienable right of a State freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems”. It therefore declares that all States have the duty to “refrain from any action or attempt, in any form or under any pretext, to destabilize or undermine the stability of another State”. This is why for 30 consecutive votes the UN General Assembly voted in favor of an annual resolution demanding the United States to end the blockade. This resolution is systematically disobeyed by the US.
In the most recent report prepared by the Cuban Foreign Ministry on the economic damage caused by the blockade, it was estimated that during the first 14 months of the Biden administration, the damage caused to Cuba amounted to 6,364 million dollars. In other words, more than 454 million dollars a month and 15 million dollars a day. In the sixty years of the blockade, the economic damage to the Caribbean country is estimated at 154,217 million dollars.
Source: Alai, translation Resumen Latinoamericano – US