By Valerio Arcary, Resumen Latinoamericano, March 22, 2024.
Lula
After the summer of 2024, the fate of the coalition government led by Lula remains uncertain. The evolution of the judicial investigations on the coup is cornering bolsonarismo, after the testimonies of the Army and Air Force commanders. But the extreme right maintains a counter-offensive after the neo-fascist avalanche on Paulista Avenue, seeking a position of strength in the streets to influence the Congress. What will be the dynamics of the situation? One possibility is that the trial of the generals and Bolsonaro will have a quick outcome with conviction and imprisonment. Another is that the social shock force of the extreme right will be large enough to feed political blackmail to buy time, indefinitely. The indeterminate formula that “anything can happen” is not reasonable. Although the government is at a crossroads, some calculation of probabilities is possible. The ministerial meeting of March 18 responded to the need to respond to the drop in approval ratings in opinion polls[1].
Lula is aware that, if not reversed, the conditions for governance will erode, diminish and weaken. But it is not prudent to reduce the negative oscillations to a lack of communication about the government’s achievements. The challenge is greater and requires courage.
Brazil has changed over the last ten years and remains fractured. Political support no longer depends solely on the positive fluctuations of the economic reality. There is a political-ideological struggle with the extreme right that the government does not undertake. The support of the bourgeois agribusiness fraction to the extreme right is solid. The displacement of a majority of the middle classes that resent the neo-fascists continues. The alignment of the portion of the population organized by neo-pentecostal ecclesiastical groups has not diminished. The horizon of the municipal elections is now the central battle. An electoral victory of Bolsonaro’s candidates or accomplices, in the big cities, greatly deteriorates the political relationship of forces. After the failure of the January 8 uprising, a new insurrectional attempt would be unthinkable. The extreme right decided to reposition itself to contest the elections of 2024 and 2026. The electoral calendar defines the terrain of the inevitable confrontation.
There are three major scenarios, in broad strokes, facing Brazil, but, for now, a prediction remains impossible. The government may reach 2026 with sufficient approval, as Lula did in 2006 and 2010, and achieve reelection. The government could arrive in 2026 as Dilma Rousseff arrived in 2014, and the outcome will be unpredictable. Finally, the left may arrive in 2026 very worn out and very rejected, as was the situation with Haddad’s candidacy in 2018, and the far-right opposition may be the favorite. Mind you, we must always remember the Forrest Gump factor: “things happen. Bad things happen. There is randomness, the accidental, the random. And two years is a long time. The assumption that Lula would already be the favorite in 2026 is an unfounded conclusion. The decisive question is whether or not the unfavorable social relation of forces for the working class since 2016 will be reversed. It has not yet. The decision not to engage in social mobilization because it remains too difficult and, worse, the astonishing ban on anti-fascist events on the 60th anniversary of the 1964 coup indicate a lack of understanding of the challenge.
It is not uncommon for the analysis of trends and counter-trends in the evolution of the economic, social and political situation to be “dazzled” by the temptation of omnipotence and deceived by mental “inertia”. Because tomorrow may not be a smooth continuation of yesterday. It is not possible to anticipate the changes in the world situation until 2026, the fluctuations in the economic situation, the ups and downs in ideological and cultural disputes, the transformations in the moods of classes and class fractions, the stratagems, the ruses, the scandals, the maneuvers of the parties and the leadership, and to dominate all the variables. But the results of the elections in Argentina at the end of 2023 and in Portugal in 2024 should trigger a yellow alert signal. The liberal faction that tried a third way candidacy and failed, but then repositioned itself in the second round and accepted to enter the government, demands, without interruption, a turn to the right to maintain support: it condemns Lula for denouncing the genocide perpetrated by the State of Israel, wants to preserve the tax exemption for the 17 sectors benefited by Dilma’s government after the shock wave of the 2007 global crisis, does not accept the attempt of some control over Petrobrás and Vale, etc. If the government does not make a turn to the left, it runs the risk of losing support in the bourgeois fraction that has one foot inside the government and the other outside and, simultaneously, losing support in its social base.
On the road to 2026, the second half of 2024 will be determined by municipal elections. There will be, simultaneously, three very different elections: (a) there will be elections in capitals, metropolises and cities of metropolitan regions; (b) elections will be held in large cities with more than 50,000 voters; (c) there will be elections in small municipalities. Three tactical challenges must be in the left’s calculus, preserving a sense of proportions: (a) in the large metropolises, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Porto Alegre, Recife, Fortaleza and Belém, the biggest challenge will be the dispute with bolsonarismo, the nationalization of the inescapable struggle and the decision to fight with the will to win; (b) in the small municipalities the capillarity and social implantation of the right and extreme right is much greater than that of the entire social and political left, and the central task is to put up a good fight and accumulate forces, seeking to courageously elect councilors; (c) in the big cities, a location in between, there will be some disputes closer to those of the capitals, and others closer to the small municipalities.
Another issue is the campaign line. In the most combative sectors of the left there is already a certain frustration with the limits of Lula’s government. Faced with the “minimalist” impasse of the reformism of the Lula government, a part of the radical left is inclined to defend the maximum program. The emulation of a “beautiful program”, grandiose, imposing, utopian: equality, socialism, revolution, nationalization of strategic enterprises, popular councils. Or you let yourself be seduced by the radicalization of the methods of struggle and the proposals for mobilization. These are not good ways. Elections should be an opportunity for political education for millions of people. Maintaining dialogue with the broad popular masses requires a transitional program with concrete proposals to change lives that respond to the most felt needs in the cities, but respecting the level of consciousness. Brazil is not in a pre-revolutionary situation. It is still in a reactionary situation. The program cannot be the same regardless of the situation.
The Lula government’s project is to take advantage of the international context of economic recovery after the impact of the pandemic in the hope that it will continue to be driven, once again by China and now, also, by India. His goal is to maintain a pact with the bourgeois faction that supported him in the 2022 runoff against Bolsonaro and integrated the cabinet, governance in Congress with the center, to ensure continued growth and implementation of reforms. In the first year in office, the transitional Proposed Amendment to the Constitution (PEC) enabled growth close to 3% and an increase in labor income of 12%, the expansion of the Bolsa Familia program that in 13 of the 27 states benefits more people than workers with formal contracted employment, the recovery of the minimum wage, the restructuring of IBAMA and FUNAI, the new Pé de Meia program for high school students, the recovery of the National Vaccination Plan, the support of public banks to the Desenrola Plan that favors indebted families, the expansion of access to credit with the fall in interest rates, the expansion of more than 100 units of the Federal Institutes, in addition to other initiatives that benefit the masses. It aims at growth while preserving inflation control within the target, insisting on a gradual fiscal adjustment, betting on increasing foreign and domestic private investment through the fiscal framework that replaced the Spending Ceiling. In short, a bet on a “weak” reformism, weaker than between 2003/10, or almost no reform, but a guarantee of the preservation of democracy, and of the Frente Amplio against the extreme right. But in Brazil, even small reforms change the lives of millions of people.
The strategy essentially repeats the project that was built after the 2002 electoral victory and that allowed electoral victories in 2006, 2010, 2014 and, dangerously, 2022. The premises underpinning it are based on three calculations. The first is a bet that the danger of a new conspiracy, such as the one that led to the institutional coup that overthrew Dilma Rousseff’s government, would be ruled out. The second is the assessment that the electoral defeat of the extreme right and the ineligibility of Bolsonaro make the hypothesis of a victory of a Bolsonaro heir in 2026 highly improbable, if not impossible. The third is the prediction that the bourgeois division on the need to preserve the democratic-electoral regime is irreversible and that, in a second round in 2026, the capitalist fraction expressed through Geraldo Alckmin and Simone Tebet, will again defend Lula. because it is not willing to run the risk of a second extreme right-wing presidency.
The three calculations have more than a “grain of truth”, but they seriously ignore the terrible risks they pose. They forget the lessons of the 2016 coup against Dilma Rousseff. The most important are five: a) the first is the underestimation of the neo-fascist current, the most catastrophic mistake of the last seven years, its audacity, its social and cultural implantation, its willingness to fight frontally, the confidence in Bolsonaro’s political leadership, therefore, the resilience of the social support of the extreme right which reveals that the dispute is not reduced only to the perception of improvements in living conditions, because it also has at its root a fierce political-ideological and even cultural struggle. by a reactionary worldview; (b) the second is the fantasy that it is possible to maintain, indefinitely, “cold” governability, and the idealization of the Frente Amplio, believing that the bourgeois leaders incorporated into the ministry will maintain their loyalty, forgetting the role of Michel Temer and exaggerating the confidence in the stability of the government which is based on the agreements with the Centrão in the National Congress, forgetting the danger of threat through unacceptable blackmails; (c) the third is the personal underestimation of Bolsonaro as opposition leader and pre-candidate, even when he is not eligible, because, if necessary, they can replace him with someone else – Tarcísio, Michelle, or even another “character””- confident that the possibility of transferring votes is still possible; d) the fifth is the possibility of Trump’s election in the US, which would generate a catalytic effect worldwide, also in Brazil, and victories of the extreme right in the next European elections, in addition to an intensification of conflicts in the international system with China.
Finally, when we think about the future, we face the problem of the role of individuals in history. Bolsonaro’s ineligibility diminishes, but does not cancel the role he will have in Brazil until 2026. It would be much less important if he were convicted and arrested. The three scenarios outlined – Lula’s favoritism, a close election, or favoritism of the far-right opposition – depend on so many factors that it is not possible to calculate the probabilities in advance. A Marxist analysis cannot lose the sense of proportions. Leaders represent social forces. But it would be an unforgivable superficiality to despise Bolsonaro’s protagonism: his presence made the difference. Would the extreme right have transformed into a political, social and cultural movement with massive influence, even without Bolsonaro, after 2016? This is counterfactual, but the most likely hypothesis is yes. Neo-fascism is an international current. The simultaneous strength of Donald Trump in the USA, Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, Santiago Abascal in the Spanish state and now André Ventura in Portugal and Javier Milei in Argentina cannot be explained as a coincidence. Objective conditions pushed a fraction of the ruling class to embrace a liberal strategy of frontal clash. But the concrete form that neo-fascism took depended largely on Bolsonaro’s charisma. Bolsonaro is crude, brutal, intemperate, but he is not an idiot. An idiot does not get elected president in a complex country like Brazil. Bolsonaro does not have much education or repertoire, but he is intelligent, cunning, a rogue. No energetic person conquers the leadership position he still enjoys today, after so many accusations: disregard for the risk to the lives of millions, personal appropriation of presidential jewels, military coup conspiracy, etc. The key to explain his role is the disconcerting charisma that drives a passionate identification. He united the representation of the interests of the bourgeois fraction of agribusiness that denies global warming, with the resentment of the military and the police, the resentment of the middle classes with the popular distrust manipulated by the neo-Pentecostal ecclesiastical corporations, the nostalgic reactionaryism of the military dictatorship with machismo, racism and homophobia. He did not need Milei’s tousled hair and anarcho-capitalist anti-caste rhetoric, nor Trump’s xenophobic national-imperialism, nor Le Pen’s Islamophobic rage. If he were convicted and imprisoned, his authority would be diminished.
[1] The disapproval of Lula’s (PT) government in the city of São Paulo increased 9 points in an interval of little more than six months, and its approval fell 7. In total, 38% of those interviewed say they consider the PT’s management to be excellent or good. Another 28% rate it as average and 34% as terrible. Consultation on 18/03/2024.me