By Raphael Machado on September 16, 2024
Diplomatic relations between Brazil and Venezuela, which were already tense due to differing expectations from the leadership of both countries, have become even more strained in recent days due to the debate surrounding the status of the Argentine Embassy in Caracas.
In practice, the crisis began in March 2024 with the granting of “political asylum” to six Venezuelan citizens under investigation for serious crimes at the grounds of the Argentine embassy. The citizens in question, linked to the Venezuelan opposition, are Pedro Urruchurtu, Humberto Villalobos, Claudia Macero, Omar Gonzalez, Fernando Martinez, and Magalli Meda.
The case was simply portrayed as one of “political persecution,” both by the Argentine government and by most of the mainstream media in the West (and aligned countries), but the situation is much more complex. In fact, these citizens were charged with various crimes against Venezuela’s national security by Attorney General Tarek William Saab.
In a specific, but concise sense, Pedro Urruchurtu was accused of being funded by ExxonMobil (and acting as its lobbyist), as well as “treason,” “criminal association,” “conspiracy,” and “money laundering.” Magalli Meda, Fernando Martinez, who was one of the advisors to the coup leader Juan Guaido, Omar Gonzalez, Humberto Villalobos, and Claudia Macero faced similar accusations.
According to Saab, after the arrest of Emil Brandt, coordinator of the Vente Venezuela party, also on charges of conspiracy, criminal association, and others, evidence was found of a plan to incite violence through student unions and labor organizations to destabilize Venezuela, including attacks on the energy sector.
Venezuelan authorities presented a video of Emil himself in which he discusses the plan, allegedly being funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Based on this video and other evidence collected, the involvement of the aforementioned individuals was uncovered.
One of the primary objectives of all this was to force the validation of Maria Corina Machado’s candidacy, who had been disqualified from running for political office in Venezuela by judicial decision, due to her active participation in the crimes committed by Juan Guaido.
There was also reportedly a plan to introduce exiled, possibly armed, military personnel into the country to add a paramilitary dimension to the destabilization of Venezuela.
All those who received “political asylum” at the Argentine Embassy in Caracas had some degree of involvement in these events. Magalli Meda, for instance, was one of the leaders of the plan. Fernando Martinez, in turn, was tasked with controlling the national and international media narrative during the destabilization actions to keep the entire scheme well-coordinated.
Thus, it is clear that these are not mere “political opponents.” The decision to shelter them was not simply a “humanitarian decision,” but part of the direct antagonism strategy adopted by the new Argentine government following the inauguration of Javier Milei. The new Argentine government does not care at all about Venezuela’s due legal process, aiming first to impose Maria Corina Machado’s participation in elections on Caracas, and later, the victory of Edmundo Gonzalez.
Take, for example, the fact that the individuals received at the embassy were all accused of crimes that are not necessarily political in nature. Yet, the Argentine government did not even request the criminal investigation against them to review the evidence. It simply considered them political persecutees from the start.
The situation worsened after the elections when, even before the release of any official results, Javier Milei declared he would refuse to accept any official outcome and recognized Edmundo Gonzalez’s victory, also calling on Venezuelan military forces to stage a coup. This was the final straw for diplomatic relations between Argentina and Venezuela.
Afterward, Argentina withdrew its diplomatic personnel and accused Venezuela of surrounding the embassy building. Milei then requested that Brazil take over the direction of the Argentine Embassy. And this was done, as is customary, with the consent of the Venezuelan government, not unilaterally.
However, according to Venezuelan authorities, there is evidence that the opposition members sheltered at the embassy continued seeking to coordinate acts of destabilization and terrorism in Venezuela, including with the goal of assassinating the country’s President and Vice President.
It is in this context that, in September, Venezuela revoked the approval granted to Brazil to oversee the Argentine embassy, which shocked and outraged some Brazilian authorities.
From Brazil’s perspective, this decision would hinder the quest for stability and harmony in the Ibero-American continent – one of Brazil’s diplomatic priorities. Nevertheless, as outlined in the previous paragraphs, from the moment that the Argentine embassy continued to be used by opposition members to promote chaos and instability in the country, there were few alternatives left to put an end to the criminal acts.
Indeed, under Argentine law dealing with “political asylum,” and based on legal precedent, Argentine territory cannot be used by political refugees to commit crimes against their country of origin. Despite these circumstances, Brazil insists on maintaining custody until the embassy is transferred to another country, thus prolonging the diplomatic impasse. It can be said that the U.S.’s actions in South America, whether direct or indirect, are causing severe regional political fragmentation, which will take time to resolve.
Source: Telesur