By Mision Verdad on November 11, 2024
Venezuelan far-right opposition politicians Henrique Capriles and María Corina Machado. photo Federico Parra/AFP.
.
Both María Corina Machado and Edmundo González have sent their congratulations to Donald Trump after his victory in the US presidential race. As expected, their first statements have aimed to project closeness and support for the cause of regime change in Venezuela.
“President Trump, the democratic government that we Venezuelans elected on July 28… will be a reliable ally to work with your administration,” Machado posted on her X account, adding that these are “decisive days” and that she is certain that she has “the support of the peoples of the Americas and their democratic governments to ensure a transition to democracy [in Venezuela] without delay.”
From Spain, Edmundo González, former candidate of the far-right Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), sent his congratulatory message, illegally identifying himself as the “elected president” of Venezuela and advocating for the “strengthening of our relations, always for the benefit of our peoples.”
The messages from both politicians, representatives of the pro-intervention and pro-sanctions sector of the Venezuelan far-right opposition, have sought to open a window of high expectations regarding the return of the US magnate to the White House, in the hope that an eventual increase in pressure, coercive measures and other destabilizing actions against the government of President Nicolás Maduro will empower them again and return them to the spotlight.
At first glance, this sector’s hope is that Washington will continue to push the “electoral fraud” narrative that emerged after the July 28 elections and has fizzled out since then, resulting in the Venezuelan issue being diluted in the White House’s foreign policy priorities during the final weeks of the outgoing Biden administration.
The messages from Machado and González have encouraged a perception that the Republican’s victory represents a “victory” for the Venezuelan far right, largely due to the foreign policy adopted by the first Trump administration against Venezuela, in which the mechanisms of economic, financial and commercial suffocation against Venezuela were intensified, in addition to the launch of invasion attempts by mercenaries.
It was during the first Trump administration that Juan Guaidó was recognized as “interim president,” and under the pretext of the US recognizing that fake “government,” Venezuelan resources and assets abroad amounting to tens of billions of dollars were seized, including the CITGO Refineries, a subsidiary of PDVSA in the United States.
Various mainstream media have attempted to set the tone for public opinion in this direction, encouraging far-right politicians who have advocated redoubling Washington’s intervention maneuvers against Venezuela.
“It is a political victory for both Edmundo González and María Corina Machado, who have been long-time allies of the Republican Party. There is no doubt that there will be a reorientation of policy towards Venezuela,” said opposition political analyst Daniel Arias, when consulted by the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo.
Apart from Trump’s victory in the presidential election, the Republicans have obtained a majority in the Senate, and are hoping to achieve a majority in the House of Representatives, which would give them total control of the US parliament.
“If this happens, Senator Marco Rubio could take advantage of this majority to push for ‘tougher and more forceful policies towards governments that confront the United States,’” El Tiempo quoted Arias as saying.
Trump’s campaign message
These expectations, however, are tempered by uncertainty about the stance that Trump may adopt in his second term, especially in light of the negative impact on his political image of the failure of the “maximum pressure” strategy and the failed “Guaidó project.”
This probable factor of reconsideration is based on an analysis of the issues that Donald Trump addressed during his electoral campaign. Regarding Venezuela, Laura Dib, director for Venezuela of the Washington Office on Latin American Affairs, told El Tiempo that “the statements on this issue have been, in reality, very superficial.”
In his ambiguity, Trump emphasized the effects of Venezuelan migration to the United States, and echoed the stigmatization of Venezuelans as alleged criminals, citing the gang Tren de Aragua.
The PUD’s statements were aimed precisely at highlighting this part of the speech of the US president-elect. After congratulating him on the results of November 5 and expressing the desire of Machado and González for the next US government to support the “peaceful transition” (a pseudonym for coup d’état), the opposition coalition highlighted, “In the United States, more than 545,000 Venezuelan migrants who fled the crisis in our country are living and building, working every day, a better future for themselves, their families, and the nation that welcomed them. It is necessary to continue and strengthen policies that allow for their integration and protection.”
The migratory aspect of the PUD is important and creates a labyrinthine scenario for the opposition in general, with its various currents and organizational expressions, with respect to Trump.
The relationship between the tightening of US sanctions and the intensification of the migratory flow from Venezuela has been proven, a factor that implies a dead end for the extremist sector that promotes economic aggression against Venezuela. In doing so, this sector also encourages the departure of Venezuelans from the country in a restrictive and threatening context with respect to migration launched by Trump, who has promised massive deportation operations on more than one occasion.
On the other hand, publicly emphasizing the closeness to Trump would bring negative political consequences for the opposition, amid the deterioration of the conditions of Venezuelan migrants in the US. This is what underlies the PUD’s digression from Machado, as PUD seems to want to avoid running a political and reputational cost that does not worry Machado much.
Facing the abyss, with uncertainty
In addition, not everyone in the anti-Chavista universe thinks the same about the US president-elect. Thus, apart from the labyrinth regarding the sanctions-immigration dichotomy, a climate of fragmentation of criteria is emerging within the opposition.
On the other, more moderate side of the opposition spectrum, which too has a history of supporting conspiracies and economic coercive measures promoted by Washington but currently does not appear to be interested in regime change, it seems that a return to an aggressive strategy against Venezuela, lacking channels of negotiation and agreements, would harm them as a political force.
Henrique Capriles, who is part of this trend, also commented on social media about Trump’s victory, referring indirectly to the sanctions and in clear opposition to the celebratory tone set by Machado and González. In his post he stressed that “no measure that weakens the social fabric of Venezuelans will be successful,” pointing out the need for “a new stage of relations where negotiations advance.”
The internal clashes in the Primero Justicia party, which led Capriles to resign from its board of directors, are representative of the consequences of having renounced channels of dialogue and, instead, following the strategy of economic pressure and institutional non-recognition led by María Corina Machado.
On the other hand, the governor of Zulia state, Manuel Rosales, another opposition figure who has distanced himself from Machado’s agenda since the results of July 28, limited himself to congratulating Donald Trump on his election without making any additional comments.
The opposing positions on their expectations regarding the direction that the US government’s foreign policy will take in the next four years also reveal pre-existing divisions in an already critical environment for the Venezuelan far-right opposition: a disintegrated leadership amid the strategy of a Guaidó 2.0 with Edmundo González, without a defined political direction for January 10, 2025 or for the electorions next year, and without even being certain whether María Corina Machado is in Venezuela.
Source Mision Verdad, translation: Orinoco Tribune