By José Ramón Cabañas Rodríguez on April 27, 2022
credit: Cubadebate
After four years in which the United States was unwilling to hold official talks with Cuba on the issue of migration, delegations from both countries met in Washington, D.C., on April 21 for that purpose.
In December 2018, after two years of justifying its distancing from the island using the fiction of so-called sonic attacks, the State Department was considering with the Cuban embassy in Washington the possibility of reestablishing the migration talks, which normally took place every six months, as well as resuming the work of the Bilateral Commission.
However, in January 2019, the US apparatchik fabricated a new obstacle to limit bilateral relations: the alleged presence of 20,000 Cuban troops in Caracas “to ensure the survival of the Maduro regime.” From that moment on, hostile actions did not cease, culminating in the absurd reinstatement of Cuba on the list of countries that allegedly sponsor terrorism.
During those months, candidate Joe Biden campaigned among Cuban Americans with plans to change certain policies toward the island, mentioning first and foremost components of the so-called family agenda: travel, remittances, and consular services. However, neither as president-elect nor as president in office did Biden modify any of his predecessor’s actions, which had reduced bilateral diplomatic relations with Cuba to a minimum.
Fifteen months after Biden took office, during which time several government officials made statements against Cuba that were either confusing or reminiscent of Trump, the announcement came of a first meeting between diplomats from both countries to discuss a single issue on the vast bilateral agenda.
The news came without much prior notice. In the end, the talks lasted barely a day, and the press releases from both delegations seemed to agree on the essence of the matter: ensuring regular, orderly, and safe migration. However, the attitudes of each side differ as to the real purpose.
Just before the meeting, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said that the three existing migration agreements with Cuba had been “discontinued” during the Trump era. In the absence of further comments from the US side, this is a statement that requires some consideration.
The previous administration, particularly the direct subordinates of Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, disregarded the obligations to which the United States was bound under those agreements and never responded to Cuba’s repeated requests to directly address the concerns that both sides had on this issue.
It is worth noting that the last of these agreements, signed in January 2017, reduced irregular emigration from Cuba to the United States to virtually zero. One might wonder why the Donald Trump administration did everything in its power to undo a historic achievement that could have served as a model for resolving similar issues with other countries.
It has been repeated time and again that Trump adopted an anti-immigrant policy, with all the symbolism of the wall on the border with Mexico and the mass expulsions of irregular immigrants. The latter, incidentally, were more or less on a par with those carried out during the Obama years; Biden, for his part, has not abandoned this pace. The wall, despite the announcements and promotional photos, remained unfinished. What Trump actually did with all his histrionics was to reduce the price of undocumented immigrant labor, which normally takes on the lowest-paid jobs in that economy, particularly in the construction sector, where the tycoon manages his fortune. A demonized and persecuted immigrant will accept any wage offer if they risk being reported and deported from the country. Just business.
But the Trump team’s attitude toward Cuba was unique: it cut off the granting of visas in Havana, transferred that “service” to third countries, and did not respect the minimum number (20,000 per year) of visas for immigrants provided for in bilateral agreements.
The irregular flows of Cubans to the United States were not immediately significant for several reasons: economic conditions in Cuba were favorable, the extreme tightening of the blockade had not yet taken place, there was no accumulated demand for visas, and many postponed their travel plans in anticipation of a likely policy change that could occur with the future election of a new government.
To get an idea of the volume of travel that had been regularized between Cuba and the United States since the Cuban immigration reform took place, the following figures should be considered:
In the first half of 2019, the figures already indicated that the totals could be higher than those of the previous year. In all those years, the number of travelers who did not return to the island within 24 months of departure was negligible. Those who remained in the United States could easily take advantage of the Cuban Adjustment Act and settle there without fear of deportation.
During that time, US officials only referred to the immigration agreements with Cuba to satisfy the interest in returning to the island those they considered “excludable,” both in the sense of the 1984 agreement and those who had committed some offense after that and were no longer acceptable in that society.
Then came 2020 with its particular burden of COVID-19, plus the unbridled US action to turn a geographical island into an economic island, disconnected from the rest of the world. Cuba was the only exception Washington made when it came to not applying sanctions regimes against third parties in their entirety, with the aim of providing space to mitigate the effects of the pandemic.
Cubans, who under national law have the right to apply for a passport and travel to the country of their choice, began to head for third countries with the aim of reaching their desired and forbidden final destination: the United States.
As a result, Washington set out to pressure third countries to limit, and in some cases close, their borders to Cuban nationals.
The legend of the uniqueness of Cuban migration began to be woven once again, with talk of thousands of people “fleeing the regime” and citing absolute figures without comparing them to other countries that are major sources of migration. The press that has repeated these arguments against Cuba has not even calculated that this flow is only a relatively small fraction of the total number of visas (immigrant plus temporary) that have not been granted in Havana for years.
If the current irregular flow of Cubans to the United States is considered unique, imagine what would happen if Washington imposed an economic, commercial, and financial blockade on the rest of the countries in the region and at the same time suspended consular services and the granting of visas in their respective capitals.
The history of migratory relations between the United States and Cuba points to two clear conclusions:
When the United States has restricted normal migration from Cuba for political reasons, crises have ensued, with direct consequences for migrants and for the national security of these countries.
When both countries have negotiated directly on the issue, agreements have been reached, periods of stability have existed, and formulas have been found to regulate the flow and make it predictable.
As far as is known, the US delegation that attended the meeting on the 21st only spoke of a limited resumption of consular services in Havana, both in terms of personnel and the total number of visas.
The question that must be answered in the coming weeks is simple: Does the Biden administration really want to normalize migration relations with Cuba and comply with all existing obligations under the bilateral agreements on the matter, or does it intend to further exacerbate this dispute and generate a new crisis?
What may be incomprehensible to many is that both Biden and a good number of his subordinates in the current administration were part of, or supported, the negotiations with Cuba that made it possible to draft the aforementioned migration agreements of January 2017. They did so on the assumption that this outcome was in the US national interest.
However, both the acting president and the rest of those officials have so far embarked on the continuation of a Trumpist policy, whose main objective was to erase from the history books the most relevant aspects of the legacy of the first black president of the United States. It seems that when it comes to Cuba, the thin dividing line between Democrats and Republicans has been erased once again.
José Ramón Cabañas Rodríguez is Director of the International Policy Research Center (CIPI) in Havana, Cuba.
Source: International Policy Research Center (CIPI) translation Resumen Latinoameicano – English