By José Ramón Cabañas Rodríguez on June 10, 2021
Foto: Michael Ciaglo
Several articles have appeared in the US press in mid-2021 citing the impact of the “Cuban vote” as a likely reason why the Joe Biden administration has not yet corrected the setbacks in bilateral relations with Cuba under the previous administration.
When assertions such as these are seen as a shower of stars in the US media, it means that there is a consensus among a group of observers, or that the idea has been intentionally launched to see how far it is accepted or rejected by the public.
Much has been written on this subject on both sides of the Florida Straits.
Professor Guillermo Grenier and his team at Florida International University have an accurate record of changes in opinion among Cubans living in that state since 1991. From Havana, experts such as Dr. Antonio Aja and Dr. Jesús Arboleya, from the Center for Demographic and Migration Studies, have data and conclusions that coincide with Grenier’s observations.
Experts on the subject agree that the percentage of Cuban-Americans registered to vote is and has been a tiny fraction of Florida residents eligible to vote, that they do not vote as a bloc or in relation to the issues on the ballot, and that in those districts where they have a greater presence, the Democrats have always won, although the state as a whole alternates between one party and the other in each election. But despite this, the issue resurfaces every four years.
Perhaps we should propose setting the figures aside for a moment and delve into qualitative issues.
After all, the statistics analyzed are in most cases approximations, not definitive data, since there are no official records of how many Cubans are eligible to vote in each cycle, how many register, and even less about who voted and for which candidates. Speculation on the subject is based on polls and other partial studies, which in a polarized environment are increasingly questionable.
There is one factor that is rarely considered when trying to understand voting patterns among Cubans. Half of all non-agricultural jobs in the state of Florida are related to services (from restaurants to fishmongers) or belong to the state apparatus, particularly the various levels of the education system.
In other words, a low-income Cuban (especially a recent arrival) who does not declare his or her counterrevolutionary beliefs (even if he or she votes differently) will always have reduced employment opportunities and, therefore, reduced ability to support his or her family. In the service sector, they will be interviewed by the generations who first “went into exile” following the revolutionary triumph. Many non-decision-making government jobs are filled through mechanisms reminiscent of the pre-revolutionary Cuban “chambelona” system: vote in exchange for a checkbook.
We have a right to ask why, if there is as large a Jewish population in New York as in Israel, which also has powerful organizations to promote its interests, we never hear about the Jewish vote as a defining factor at the national or local level. A similar question could be asked about the number of Mexicans in the south and west of the country, who rarely appear as a decisive factor in one election or another.
The so-called “Cuban vote” in the United States is a political product that has been well promoted in the electoral market, is substantially financed, and has a significant group of buyers and advertisers. But it is still just that, a manufactured product, fiction rather than real history.
The first Cuban Americans to win elected office in local politics in South Florida were Democratic activists who came to power without the support of a well-oiled machine from the local to the federal level. It was not until 1982 that the first version of the “Cuban vote” was manufactured under the administration of Ronald Reagan.
During the previous two decades, US federal agencies (dominated by alternating Democrats and Republicans) had gradually built a “community” that had unique legal backing to establish its enclave (Cuban Adjustment Act), which had special budgets to guarantee their settlement in their new destination and always had a preferential political space in mainstream US social thought, as a consequence of “extra-hemispheric communism.”
No other immigrant group enjoyed such privileges, no other immigrant group had an identity built with such a high level of articulation and resources.
After the Mariel Port migration (1980) and the American society’s interpretation of the new migrants, it became clearer that large sectors of the “Cuban-American community” would not join projects such as the Bay of Pigs invasion or Operation Mangoose. Increasingly, the “liberation” of Cuba seemed like a goal that would not be achieved immediately, or in a single blow, and would therefore require long-term planning.
There is a vast literature on Cuban-American leaders, when in reality the ‘presidents’ and “coordinators” of the main organizations that brought them together acted in some way as operatives of the US special services. In this capacity, although several were already retired, they carried out political tasks with the hidden financial backing of the US federal budget.
Curiously, although they promoted the “cause” of restoring ‘democracy’ in Cuba, none of them were willing to stand for election within their organization, with very rare exceptions, nor did they abandon or have abandoned their “positions” for decades. Those who have died were succeeded monarchically by their closest relatives. Many of the so-called Cuban-American “organizations” had fewer members than words in their names.
The qualitative evolution of Cuban-Americans in the 1980s was supported by the perception of Republican influence peddlers, with the reasoning that such a group could become an important factor in expanding and consolidating the party’s presence in a state with strong rival (Democratic) militancy that was becoming increasingly important in the Electoral College game in presidential elections, or in adding and subtracting support in the House of Representatives in midterm elections.
The leaders who were chosen to head the so-called “Cuban vote” promised loyalty only in exchange for the approval of “anti-Cuba” programs in the federal Congress, which carried significant funding, most of which would be invested where? In South Florida, of course.
Hundreds and thousands of Cuban-Americans have paraded through the ranks of the so-called Radio and TV Martí and the employee lists of countless “regime change” programs, shaping a way of life and creating a fortune thanks to the sale of the product known as the “Cuban vote.”
The circle of opportunism closed when a significant portion of the aforementioned funds passed from the pockets of federal employees to the political campaigns of those candidates who swore allegiance to whom? To the Republican Party, of course.
In the early 1990s, Florida sponsors of the “Cuban vote” showed a certain coming of age by distancing themselves from their Republican “parents” (George H. W. Bush’s team) to support a rival candidate (William J. Clinton) who promised extreme measures against the island (the so-called Torricelli Act).
However, despite the agreement at the political summit, the voting patterns of Cuban Americans did not change significantly, either in the 1992 or 1996 elections. History tells us that in 2000, the “Cuban vote” was not decisive for George W. Bush. His victory was sealed thanks to the palace coup staged by Cuban congas to stop the recount of votes in Miami-Dade.
Despite these swings in the preferences of Cuban-American leaders, the Democratic Party was unable to create its own product (with an associated discourse) to try to prevail among Cuban-Americans, much less promote it.
Thanks to the verbal and physical aggression of Miami’s leaders, in many cases Democrats did not even dare to open local offices or print flyers to stick on lampposts. The most significant Republican victory occurred when even prominent Democrats became consumers of the “Cuban vote” narrative, which they have since digested at their convenience.
The policy toward Cuba designed by Barack Obama for the last years of his presidential term, considering the highest interests of US policy, although it did not immediately pose a challenge to the finances of the promoters of the “Cuban vote,” did indicate a preference for the role of other actors within the Cuban-American community who were not part of the caste of the first co-owners of the electoral monstrosity.
Obama was re-elected to a second term not only without the support of those people, but despite a racist opposition led by them. To the frustration of the strategists on Calle Ocho and their godfathers, in the years of official political recomposition between Cuba and the United States, all polls (accurate or not) pointed to a change in the Cuban-American attitude toward their relationship with their country of origin, the so-called “family agenda,” and to unprecedented numbers of trips to the island to participate in various ways in Cuban life.
During these same years, however, at least two other parallel processes took place that would have a certain impact on the functioning of the “Cuban vote.”
The brutal bipartisan confrontation against Chavista Venezuela caused internal destabilization, which in turn generated a migratory flow of people and capital in various directions, including, significantly, the city of Miami.
In Colombia, the interpretations generated by right-wing forces after the signing of the Peace Accords and the neoliberal policies that have been reinforced since then also prompted countless Colombians to seek to fulfill their personal expectations abroad, preferably in Florida, a place that had the added value of an extensive list of business associates in the drug trafficking business.
Neither group has created its own political structures in the new scenario so far. A high percentage of them subordinated themselves to the Cuban-American leadership in the “great crusade” against socialism in the region. Those who patented the history of the “Cuban vote” in the encyclopedia of US politics offered unconditional support to the Venezuelan and Colombian “causes.” The newcomers have only been asked to amplify the reactionary, anti-communist message and, in 2016 and 2020, to be more Trumpist than Trump himself.
The Democratic strategy to bring Joe Biden to power focused efforts and resources on states, cities, and ethnic groups they considered essential to victory. Only very close to the election did party operatives conclude that they had some chance of success in Florida and made belated efforts to attract a certain audience.
But in the face of the “Cuban vote,” they failed to present a coherent defense of their platform, did not choose candidates with a chance of success, and did not provide financial support to those who had a real chance of defeating their Democratic opponents. These mistakes left a vacuum that was filled by radical Trumpist rhetoric, fears of alien invasions, and rejection of conspiracies of all kinds.
In a way, the Republican candidate won in Florida because the Democrat had already lost in advance.
Even so, taking the exit polls at face value, the approximate percentage of the “Cuban vote” for Trump in 2020 did not deviate significantly from historical patterns, much less “tip the scales” at the state level. Other factors did, such as the inability of more than a million ex-convicts and others prosecuted by the law to regain their right to vote, despite the fact that the state’s population approved such a possibility (Issue 4) in the 2016 elections.
In any case, the election results served as a new auction of the “Cuban vote,” which many acquired at low cost and have consumed with pleasure.
The results should, however, invite some to take a different view of what has been published on the subject so far.
Despite the demonization campaigns against the real or supposed left, the establishment of a uniform discourse in all the mass media, and the demonization of any dissident on social media, between 40 and 45 percent of Cuban Americans living in South Florida remained firm in their support for the Democratic agenda. some of them aspiring to the continuation of the policy of rapprochement with the island.
There are many reasons not to buy into the myth of the “Cuban vote.” Those who do are either lacking in arguments, ideologically aligned with its promoters, or unwilling to take risks in the turbulent sea of preferences.
U.S. policy toward Cuba should be based on the national interests of that country. Not on the basis of impossible domination, which has been proven impossible for more than 60 years, but on the representation of the will of a majority of farmers, teachers, doctors, workers, civil servants, businesspeople, and also many Cuban-Americans (Democrats, Republicans, and others) who see the normalization of relations with the island as the most rational approach.
Sorry guys, the “Cuban vote” doesn’t sell here.
Source: Cubadebate, translation Resumen Latinoamericano – English