By Geraldina Colotti, on September 15, 2025

Alex Saab and Nicolas Maduro
Observing the US naval maneuvers in Caribbean waters and the provocations and threats against Bolivarian Venezuela by Trump’s second administration, a similar episode during the tycoon’s first term comes to mind. We are referring to November 2020, when the United States deployed a warship—the missile cruiser USS San Jacinto—off the coast of Cape Verde: to prevent, according to the New York Times, “the regime” in Venezuela and Iran (and later Russia) from attempting to free Alex Saab, the Venezuelan diplomat who was kidnapped and tortured for trying to break the economic siege on Venezuela by importing food and medicine. This was at the height of COVID-19, a global pandemic.
The military deployment and the figure of Alex Saab
The Trump administration had been evaluating the use of military force since Saab’s kidnapping in Cape Verde on June 12. Then-Defense Secretary Mark Esper had opposed it, considering it an “improper use” of the armed forces. The situation changed after Trump fired Esper—one of many dismissals at the top of that first administration. The new Secretary of Defense, Christopher Miller, immediately approved the military deployment.
Even then, the United States would have liked to make Alex Saab the main accuser of Nicolás Maduro, presenting him as the head of a drug trafficking network. But it did not succeed due to the diplomat’s resistance to flattery and torture, even after he was illegally extradited to Miami in violation of international law. Saab, currently Minister of Industry and National Production, was released on December 20, 2023, following a strong global mobilization led by his wife, Camilla Fabri, who supported the Bolivarian government’s diplomatic action. This battle led to a prisoner exchange between the United States and Venezuela, which returned ten American detainees involved in mercenary activities to Biden.
New maneuvers and the justification of the “war on drugs”
Today, back in power in 2024, Trump has deployed troops in the Caribbean. After an unclear episode in which he claimed to have “eliminated” (as if they were pins) 11 alleged drug traffickers who, from the coast of Venezuela, had transported drugs to the United States, a U.S. destroyer intercepted, boarded, and detained nine Venezuelan tuna fishermen for about eight hours in Venezuela’s Exclusive Economic Zone. In addition, the US Navy is flexing its muscles even more, sending its generals to visit bases in Puerto Rico, the US-occupied territory closest to Venezuela, and sending ten F-35s.
True, considering the genocide in Palestine and everything the US allows its rabid Zionist dog to do, one is tempted to believe that there is no stopping the global Wild West. However, it is useful to understand the fig leaf used to justify this in a country like the United States, accustomed to imposing its “democracy” on the rest of the world as a perfect product. The starting point has been Trump’s approval of a decree equating some drug trafficking networks (real or alleged) with terrorist organizations.
The Monroe Doctrine and the influence of Marco Rubio
Among these, the tycoon has included the phantasmagorical Cartel of the Suns, declaring that it is led by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the current Minister of the Interior, Justice, and Peace, Diosdado Cabello. He also increased the reward for Maduro’s head to $50,000. These distortions and arbitrary measures are justified by the executive order, which allows the US government to use military power in the interests of national security to combat a threat it considers to be a direct threat to the United States, regardless of where that threat is located.
The US Constitution effectively grants the president, who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, broad powers to deploy troops and military resources without a formal declaration of war approved by Congress: especially when the action is deemed necessary to protect national security and US interests abroad.
This is the “Monroe Doctrine” transferred from the 19th to the 21st century, whereby the concept of US supremacy in the Western Hemisphere must remain a pillar of American foreign policy. In Trump’s case, figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio have revived this doctrine, justifying intervention, even armed intervention, to counteract the “chaos” and ‘disorder’ in the region, also caused by “the flow of drugs and immigration.”
In practice, deploying a fleet is a way of showing military strength and carrying out interception operations in international waters, acting as a “deterrent” without having to launch a large-scale invasion. It is an action that is presented as a defense of US borders rather than an attack on a foreign country.
The Trump administration’s objectives in Latin America
It is not that Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, who held Rubio’s position before him, were not supporters of “maximum pressure” to achieve the long-dreamed-of “regime change” in Venezuela, and did not organize multiple strategies to achieve it. Rubio, however, seems intent on moving from words to deeds with military intervention as well. Today, he appears to be the real strongman of the US administration, in his capacity as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. Already during Trump’s first term, as a Republican senator from Florida, elected by rabid anti-communist power brokers, he had a notable influence on the administration’s foreign policy toward Latin America.
For years, he has pushed conservative governments against Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, trying to overthrow their governments, which he defines as “illegitimate.” Now, with no further restraints, he has defined the Nicaraguan government as “an enemy of humanity,” Maduro as “a fugitive from US justice,” who is not a head of government but the leader of “a terrorist and criminal organization that has taken over a national territory,” and has showered praise on Nayib Bukele of El Salvador.
An “exemplary leader” whom, according to a U.S. government document released by the courts, the United States agreed to pay $4.76 million to accept migrants deported by Trump and lock them up in detention camps as “drug traffickers sent by Maduro,” even though most of them have no criminal record.
Costs and strategies of the intervention
But how much is the US government willing to spend on regime change in Venezuela? A report by the Office of the Inspector General of the US State Department questions the expenditure of $10.5 million per year for the maintenance of properties and personnel in Caracas, including the 11-hectare embassy, the ambassador’s residence, and three other apartments, despite the breakdown of diplomatic relations in 2019. All to “pave the way for a quick replacement” of Maduro.
However, this figure is insignificant when compared to the billions of dollars needed to sustain the military deployment in the southern Caribbean, officially intended to combat drug cartels, but with Venezuela in its sights.
Cost of military deployment and Chinese influence
How much does it cost to deploy eight ships, a nuclear submarine, and ten F-35 aircraft in the Caribbean? With the help of two artificial intelligences, based on public data, the report notes that Grok, X’s AI, estimates that the cost of deploying eight ships, one nuclear submarine, ten F-35 aircraft, and 4,000 Marines for 90 days is approximately $1.73 billion.
This figure could increase to $2 billion in the event of unforeseen circumstances or decrease to $1.5 billion with the support of allies. Copilot, Microsoft’s AI, offers a much higher estimate, suggesting that the three-month deployment could cost between $16 billion and $22 billion, not counting unforeseen events. Both estimates, although not official, far exceed the operating and personnel costs incurred by diplomatic properties in Caracas, highlighting the vast military investment.
But the game is global in scope. Thus, although some sectors of Trumpism, convinced that it is better not to openly mobilize the gunboats in order to do business, show annoyance at Rubio’s strong-arm tactics, he currently boasts of being in solid agreement with Trump: not so much on Russia, but absolutely on the need to displace China from the Western Hemisphere, in line with the new Monroe Doctrine. For years, Rubio has spoken of Beijing’s global influence as a threat to security, although he has recently toned down his rhetoric because Trump would like to hold a summit with the Chinese leader.
Rubio’s foreign policy in the region
After becoming Secretary of State, Rubio began his first official trip with a visit to Panama, where he inspected the Panama Canal and pressed Panamanian leaders on the issue of the operation of two canal ports by a Hong Kong company. Following Trump’s threats to take control of the canal, in March the company agreed to sell the ports to a US-led investment group, despite opposition from the Chinese government.
Rubio also raised the issue of China’s presence during his second trip to the region, in which he visited Jamaica, Guyana, and Suriname in March. He has shown great rapport with Daniel Noboa, the business-minded president of Ecuador, where Rubio hopes to reinstall U.S. military bases.
The situation with Colombia and the consequences of the “war on drugs”
Rubio also has a mission to strengthen the position of right-wing figures in the region. He has taken up a favorite cause of Trump’s: the defense of Jair Bolsonaro, the former conservative president of Brazil, officially accused of planning a coup, and has announced that the United States would respond to the Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision to sentence Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison.
Meanwhile, he has tried to calm the concerns of some progressive leaders, such as Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum, who fear the return of US imperial power. But with Petro’s Colombia, which has announced its unwillingness to support an invasion of Venezuela, the US seems intent on acting with threats and flattery until next year, when presidential elections will be held.
In recent months, Trump officials have harshly criticized Colombia for failing to reduce the cultivation of coca, the raw material for cocaine. Production is at record levels, according to United Nations (UN) data. Coca cultivation increased by 10% between 2022 and 2023, reaching more than 252,928 hectares. During the same period, potential production—the UN’s estimate of the maximum amount of cocaine that could be produced from coca crops—increased by 53%.
Most Colombian cocaine ends up in the United States and Europe. However, the United States is threatening not to grant Colombia a certification of good anti-drug conduct, awarded after an annual review, the results of which are due to be announced on September 15. The aim is to determine whether Colombia is doing enough to combat drug trafficking. Although it is not known what the Trump administration will decide, if the certification is not approved, there could be enormous consequences.
These include the suspension of hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, the application of sanctions and visa restrictions for Colombian government officials, and damage to one of Washington’s closest alliances in Latin America. Colombia is the main beneficiary of US military spending in Latin America, and Colombian authorities warn that the loss of certification would harm both countries.
Misinformation and the perspective of the Venezuelan opposition
These are topics discussed by a galaxy of websites and think tanks, which refer to Venezuelan fascism and those who control it (all as exemplary democrats and champions of “human rights,” obviously). To access them, you need to embark on a game of Russian dolls that is not always identifiable at first glance. However, monitoring their plots and expectations at such a complex and dramatic time globally is worth the effort.
And not only at the journalistic level. It allows us to get an idea of the breadth of the ongoing confrontation, the conflicting interests that drive it, and the many gray areas that have multiplied with the fall of the Soviet Union, blurring geographical and symbolic borders.
We have the cartography of a world turned upside down, where even a historical episode, taken up by the Bolivarian government to vindicate its own sovereignty today, is distorted to push for support for the armed aggression of US imperialism and its vassals in the European Union. We are referring to the siege suffered by Venezuela between December 1902 and February 1903.
At that time, the government of Cipriano Castro was surrounded by a joint fleet from England, Germany, and Italy. The coalition demanded payment of the country’s foreign debt and alleged compensation. Cipriano Castro’s government resisted. For Venezuelan fascists, however, this historical episode does not recall the new imperialist siege to which the Bolivarian government is being subjected, but rather “the internal siege of a tyranny that has suffocated the nation.” And that, therefore, it must be overthrown by Trump’s “liberating” gunboats.
But when will they arrive? These figures ask themselves from their gilded “exile,” where they multiply forums and debates, generously paid for by the owners of the “humanitarian imperialism” that directs them. There are those who believe that some form of attack is imminent, perhaps “aimed” at collecting the reward for Maduro’s head, and they devote themselves to interpreting the images and statements of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, wondering from which “bunker” they are being made. Someone else reflects: “The reality is that the Southern Command does not have its own fleet and cannot stay there for a prolonged period; they could disappear at any moment.”
The position of the Venezuelan far right
With the lucidity typical of someone who frequently raises his elbow, former presidential candidate Edmundo González Urrutia, from Spain, recounts how beneficial the trips made so far have been, in view of “an efficient government that restores the stability of the currency and wages.” As if the neoliberal and warmongering governments of Europe, the “patriots” and various fascists who vote for resolutions against Venezuela in the European Parliament were thinking about the welfare of the popular sectors and not that of the cliques of businessmen they represent.
And, in any case, all this is based on the premise of the fall of the Bolivarian government. Which, as the Venezuelan people say every day, is by no means a fact. And that is why Urrutia whines: “Something has to happen, because a country cannot be held in suspense by a situation like the one we have, with four thousand or six thousand US armed forces stationed there, on an island near Venezuela, four warships, planes, in short, F-35s, that is, all this is a very, very important movement, so something has to happen. There is no doubt about it.”