By Pepe Escobar on May 14, 2026
A few days ago, Mr. Araghchi traveled to Russia.
Earlier this week, Mr. Araghchi traveled to China. These two trips vividly reflect the power of the new Russia-Iran-China triangle, which has emerged as the driving force behind Eurasian integration and multipolarity.
Some of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s remarks to the Iranian media were quite fascinating. For example:
“Our Chinese friends believe that post-war Iran is different from pre-war Iran. Its international standing has improved, and it has demonstrated its capabilities and power. Therefore, a new era of cooperation between Iran and other countries is on the horizon.”
That is code for indicating that Beijing now recognizes—and supports—Tehran as a major world power.
For his part, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered the definitive definition of the U.S. and Israel’s war against Iran: “Illegitimate.”
That is code for indicating that everything related to this chosen war, from its causes to its countless consequences, is mired in a quagmire of illegality.
Wang framed China’s diplomatic initiative with his characteristic courtesy: “We are willing to continue our efforts to de-escalate tensions.”
But he was much firmer on the path toward a resolution: “China believes that a complete cessation of hostilities is imperative, that reigniting the conflict is unacceptable, and that persisting in negotiations is particularly important.”
That should be the preamble to genuine negotiations leading to an end to the war—and to all wars—in West Asia against the entire Axis of Resistance. That is precisely the Iranian position.
Wang Yi emphasized that “China supports Iran in safeguarding its national sovereignty and security and appreciates Iran’s willingness to seek a political solution through diplomatic channels”.
That is code for China’s full backing of sovereign rights and diplomacy—not intimidation.
The Strait of Hormuz is absolutely vital to China due to energy imports, not only from Iran but also from the Gulf oil monarchies. Therefore, Beijing’s stance must be nuanced:
“The international community shares a common concern for restoring normal and safe passage through the strait, and China hopes that the parties involved will respond promptly to the strong calls from the international community.”
That is code for an end to the U.S. blockade, while showing respect for the new legal framework in the Strait of Hormuz that Tehran is developing.
On the nuclear issue, “China appreciates Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, while recognizing Iran’s legitimate right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”
That is exactly Tehran’s position, in stark contrast to Trump 2.0.
Welcome to the new order of West Asia
China, through Wang Yi, clarified three essential points: support for all of Iran’s reasonable demands; support for the withdrawal of U.S. military bases throughout the Persian Gulf; and active participation in Iran’s post-war reconstruction.
At the same time, Beijing is urging Arab countries to come to an agreement and work toward a new security framework—excluding the Empire of Chaos, Lies, and, most recently, Piracy (fully admitted by the U.S. president). Once again: that is exactly Tehran’s position.
With its proverbial tact, Beijing is de facto aligning itself with former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaee, the chief military advisor to the new leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
Beijing perfectly understands how Tehran is positioning resistance as a strategic asset. For the new power configuration in Tehran, the war has consisted of surviving maximum pressure—and devastating bombings—; of absorbing and controlling the escalation trap; and of refusing to yield to military and economic coercion.
All of this, taken together, could not be more strategic. Here we see how resistance has been transformed into political capital. And that translates immediately to the negotiating table, despite tactical losses (none of which are strategic).
This understanding is reflected in what are possibly the two key statements by Araghchi and Wang Yi. Let’s analyze them side by side.
Iran “supports the establishment of a new post-war regional architecture capable of coordinating development and security.”
China “supports the establishment of a regional architecture of peace and security in which the countries of the region participate jointly, safeguard common interests, and achieve common development.”
This new architecture is the new order of West Asia. So it is no wonder that the Trump 2.0 universe finds itself in a swirling disorientation.
Because this new order of West Asia is a microcosm, directly linked to the macrocosm of the New Global Order, of which China is one of the main drivers, alongside Russia.
Russia is focused on implementing, in the long term and against all odds, a Greater Eurasian Partnership, which extends toward Afro-Eurasia.
Beijing is far more ambitious. Essentially, everything falls under the Four Global Initiatives. The most recent is the Global Governance Initiative, launched at the SCO Plus summit in Tianjin in September of last year.
This follows the New Silk Roads, or BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), which then evolved into the first three Global Initiatives: the Global Development Initiative; the Global Security Initiative; and the Global Civilization Initiative—culminating in Global Governance.
Taken together, this is China’s roadmap for “building a community with a shared future for humanity”—the de facto alternative to collapsing Western liberalism. The ambition is, indeed, global.
China-Iran: Fully Aligned in West Asia
What is already quite clear is that China and Iran share a fully aligned vision for West Asia; in fact, that is the basis of their mutual trust and dependence. Beijing and Tehran understand how post-World War II history has been, in essence, a story of how Washington has used West Asia to control the planet through an obsession with oil.
As much as Tehran has learned from the Chinese way of waging war—“feigning weakness when strong” and disinterest when fully engaged in war”—Araghchi’s trip to Beijing was essential to re-solidifying the strategic partnership. As fully committed as Russia is—as confirmed by the St. Petersburg meeting between Araghchi and Putin—China remains in a “we’ve got your back” position.
Incidentally, Chinese oil tankers continue to pass daily through the Strait of Hormuz. Not a peep from Washington.
Then there is China’s outright defiance of the latest round of sanctions.
Until recently, China circumvented U.S. sanctions unofficially and/or through intermediaries. Now it officially declares that it does not recognize unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran or Russia, for example, as well as sanctions against its own oil refineries.
We are in the midst of a financial Cold War and an offensive by the RIC (Russia, Iran, China) to permanently curtail the power of the obsession with sanctions.
Iran was completely expelled from SWIFT in 2012. So what Tehran did was reconfigure the system, drawing on its experience in building a parallel trade architecture.
Iran conducts most of its cross-border trade in yuan, rubles, rupees, UAE dirhams (no longer, as of now), and Iraqi dinars. China accounts for up to 35% of Iran’s total trade. Everything is settled in yuan or through barter.
Iran and Russia formalized a currency settlement system in 2023, completely bypassing SWIFT, which connects Iran’s SEPAM and Russia’s SPFS. In the first phase of the Strait of Hormuz toll—the mechanism is constantly being adjusted and optimized—a key payment method was via China’s CIPS.
The toll is inevitable. Tehran is fully aware that Trump will never agree to pay reparations for the illegal war he started, and is also aware of the inevitable crude manipulations when it comes to lifting the freeze on Iranian funds.
The toll can serve as a substitute for obtaining reparations and collecting something equivalent to the Iranian funds frozen in Western banks; it will also force the West to lift sanctions on Iranian banks and the Iranian financial system.
After all, Tehran has already made it clear that only its banks are authorized to collect the fees in the Strait of Hormuz. Translation: all nations needing to transit will have to deal with the Iranian financial system.
Furthermore, the fees will help Iran rebuild its destroyed infrastructure.
Confronting the U.S.’s structural vulnerability isn’t even playing checkers, let alone poker. China plays weiqi (“go”). Weiqi consists of setting up the board, slowly but surely, sacrificing a detail here and there in exchange for overall supremacy. China has spent two decades patiently setting up the board. In weiqi, once the board is set up correctly, the rest of the Great Game plays out on its own.
That is where we stand now. If he possesses any intellectual curiosity, Trump will be able to see China’s powerful industrial potential (what is called “productive capitalism”) and its total control over the supply chains on which the United States depends.
He will be confronted with America’s structural vulnerability: the proverbial list of rare earths, industrial supply chains, access to materials essential for the F-35, Patriot missiles, and broad sectors of the U.S. military-industrial complex. And he will be reminded that U.S. law no longer possesses automatic extraterritorial authority within China. Yes, that hurts.
Meanwhile, the seven centuries of confrontation between Imperial Rome and Persia will continue to repeat themselves, at lightning speed, in the 21st century. The U.S. war has proven utterly impotent: impossible to win against attrition, and that will lead Persia to supremacy in West Asia.
This astonishing geopolitical shift is being achieved thanks to a potent mix of ideology, social cohesion, utter contempt for uncivilized barbarians, and the drive to ruin them through impossible logistics. Not to mention total control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Bubbles are rapidly bursting in the Empire of Chaos, Lies, and Piracy, mercilessly struck by the reality of the RIC.
Goodbye to the petrodollar? Saudi Arabia is not renewing the agreement and is betting everything on the yuan.
Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) opened a second office in mainland China earlier this year, establishing a branch in Shanghai to expand its business activities and attract more Chinese investment to the kingdom, as reported by Bloomberg on May 6.
The office was registered last year, reports to the PIF’s Beijing branch, and is led by Lily Cong, former senior representative for Fidelity International in the Chinese capital.
Reportedly, the Shanghai office was created to bolster the $1 trillion fund’s ability to close overseas deals in China, while officials also seek to attract more Chinese companies to Saudi Arabia.
This initiative strengthens Riyadh’s investment ties with Beijing, while the United States remains an important market for the kingdom. The Shanghai office expands the PIF’s global presence, which already includes offices in New York, London, Hong Kong, and Paris.
Saudi Arabia and China already maintain strategic and financial ties in various sectors, including energy and finance, while other Gulf sovereign wealth funds are also seeking to expand their exposure to China.
Abu Dhabi is reportedly also considering transferring Chinese assets held by two of its sovereign wealth funds to a new entity, a move that could pave the way for a broader shift in its investment strategy.
The investment boom in the Gulf comes amid profound changes in West Asian markets following the U.S. war against Iran, which have triggered regional upheavals, putting pressure on Gulf economies and accelerating the shift away from dollar-dominated energy trade.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states have strengthened their financial ties with China, based on the yuan, while tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have further highlighted the fragility of the “petrodollar order.”
According to a Fortune article, Riyadh has not formally renewed its commitment to price oil exclusively in U.S. dollars until 2024, a year after signing a $7 billion currency swap agreement with Beijing.
The Saudi Central Bank is also a key participant in the mBridge digital payments platform, which enables direct currency exchanges using block chain technology.
According to economists cited by Fortune, this shift reflects China’s growing weight in trade with Saudi Arabia, as Beijing has surpassed the United States as the kingdom’s largest oil customer.
“Economic gravity pointed toward the yuan, while currency sentiment pointed toward the dollar,” wrote Michael Harris, an analyst at EBC Financial Group.
Saudi Arabia continues to conduct most of its transactions in U.S. dollars, but the expansion of its financial ties with Beijing signals a broader effort to diversify trade and investment channels, while China positions the yuan as a potential alternative in global energy markets.
Pepe Escobar is a Brazilian journalist and global analyst who has contributed to Asia Times, CounterPunch, Russia Today, Cubadebate and others
Source: Cubadebate, translation Walter Lippmann