By José R. Cabañas Rodríguez on September 10, 2026
foto: Bill Hackwell
Introduction
To understand Fidel Castro’s contribution to political science—and, in particular, to the field of international relations, especially regarding Cuba’s ties with the United States—one must begin with the legacy of the work and practice of José Martí, the Cuban national hero, and the influence he had on Castro’s thought and actions.
By studying the legacy of both men in the political and social transformations that took place in Cuba during different eras, one discovers that they drew upon a deep understanding of the most advanced philosophical thought of their respective historical periods and adapted it to Cuban conditions, without extrapolations, thereby constructing a system of principles and concepts of their own that defined the country’s role as an international actor and, on that basis, its relations with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors.
In particular, Martí and Fidel studied U.S. history extensively through various authors and came to master the analysis of events and historical contexts on par with the best scholars in that country. Added to this was their practical experience within U.S. society, particularly the fruitful exchange with the Cuban communities residing in that country during each era.
For Martí, this experience enabled him to envision a system of inter-American relations different from the one proposed by the United States in the late 19th century and even served as the basis for his representation of sister nations—such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay—at the Monetary Conference of 1891. As if that were not enough, it served as the organizational backbone of a war of national liberation aimed at ensuring that, once Cuba achieved independence, that country—already harboring imperialist ambitions—would not pounce on Latin America.
By the first half of the 20th century, Martí’s vision remained unfulfilled, which is why Fidel simply adapted the principles established by the Master to the new conditions and contributed his own approaches (Guerra, Concepción, Hernández 2004)
Just as significant as these achievements, in Fidel’s case, was his personal leadership of Cuba’s bilateral relationship with the United States for nearly 50 years. In that context, Fidel devised strategies and implemented projects that are unique in the practice of international diplomacy and constitute a legacy for new generations of Cubans and for others. None of these elements are secret, and all can be understood through a careful study of his major speeches and writings.
Development
Long before the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro had reflected on the fact that, beyond removing Fulgencio Batista’s tyranny from power, the sustainability of the revolutionary project would depend on a confrontation of other dimensions with the U.S. government.
It was very important to the revolutionary leader that the purpose of his efforts be known beyond Cuba’s borders, particularly within the United States. Among other reasons, this justified his meeting with journalist Herbert Matthews (The New York Times), which made headlines as early as February 24, 1957—just three months after the start of the Sierra Maestra campaign.
At that time, the Cuban dictator’s press secretary was Edmund Chester, a former journalist for AP and CBS, and the U.S. ambassador—who would soon fall from grace and lose his post—was Arthur Gardner. Neither of them anticipated Fidel’s public relations initiative or its scope, nor were they able to prevent it. (Suárez, 2024)
In his memorable letter to Celia Sánchez Manduley dated June 5, 1958, Fidel succinctly described the relationship between the U.S. authorities and the ordeal his country was enduring: “When I saw the rockets they fired at Mario’s house, I swore to myself that the Americans are going to pay dearly for what they’re doing. When this war is over, a much longer and greater war will begin for me: the war I am going to wage against them. I realize that this will be my true destiny.”
Mario Sariol was a humble farmer from Minas de Frío who had helped the guerrillas from an early stage in the Sierra Maestra; for this reason, Batista’s air force destroyed his home and nearly wiped out his entire family, using U.S.-made rockets that were smuggled from the so-called Guantánamo Naval Base.
On January 1, 1959, from the town of Palma Soriano, Fidel celebrated the fall of Fulgencio Batista’s government, but at the same time warned about how the U.S. government, through its embassy in Havana, was trying to undermine the success of the victorious popular movement, and declared, “Perhaps from now on, everything will be more difficult.”
Just a few days after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, the new Secretariat of State (later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) sent a diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, requesting the withdrawal of U.S. military missions representing the various branches of the armed forces. Shortly thereafter, another note was sent listing the names of a group of officials from the regime of former dictator Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar—who were responsible for common crimes and crimes against the civilian population—who had emigrated to the United States, requesting their arrest and subsequent extradition. (Céspedes, 2010)
These are just two examples indicating that, from very early on, Fidel and his government team established the principles of sovereign equality and reciprocity in relations between the two countries. Dozens of diplomatic communications exchanged during those formative years demonstrate a new type of relationship that the Cuban Revolution demanded from its northern neighbor. This approach was unique in the hemisphere and remained an exception for a long time (Leogrande, Kornbluh, 2015).
A careful reading of these documents reveals that, despite differences in political opinion on a long list of issues, the Cuban side articulated its positions using well-reasoned and respectful language. It also demanded that same treatment in return. (Ramírez, Morales; 2014)
This same perspective was at the heart of Fidel’s first visit to Washington, D.C., as Prime Minister of the new government, which took place in April 1959. As Richard Nixon himself, then Vice President, put it, the Cuban representative did not go to ask for anything, as most Latin American leaders who came to the nation’s capital tended to do (Office of the Historian, 1959)
Fidel Castro went to explain why the Cuban Revolution had taken place and what his plan for governing was. He expressed his best wishes for establishing a transparent bilateral relationship. He spoke with various sectors of American society, but especially with the people—the broader public—on the street, at impromptu rallies, or at more formal events. He devoted significant time to the press, to such an extent that the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., considers the images of that exchange to be one of the 100 most significant moments in its history during the 20th century.
And this was, without a doubt, another hallmark of Cuba’s new foreign policy toward the United States: direct or indirect, but constant, interaction with that society, beyond its representatives, executives, or elected leaders.
This attitude explains why, as early as the 1960s, major religious institutions—such as the National Council of Churches—issued statements opposing the aggressive policy and blockade against Cuba. Major trade associations, including the Chamber of Commerce itself, did the same. (Cabañas, 2021)
Fidel always believed (and acted accordingly) that to the extent that the American people understood the purpose of the Revolution, there would be a greater chance of one day establishing a relationship—at least one of good neighborliness—between the two countries. This purpose was reiterated even after the armed aggression at the Bay of Pigs (April 1961) and following the near-nuclear catastrophe in October 1962. (Leogrande, Kornbluh, 2015).
Fidel did not hesitate to organize the so-called Operation Truth when the U.S. media attempted to discredit the trials held in Cuba against Batista-era criminals. Within a short time, dozens of journalists were invited to visit the island and hear the leaders’ arguments firsthand, speak with the people, and witness instances of self-criticism as well. (González, 2025)
When the U.S. government definitively chose the path of military confrontation with Cuba, of aggression of all kinds, and of attempting to isolate the island diplomatically, Fidel led a firm defense that never expressed hatred toward Americans, nor disrespect for their national symbols or historical figures.
In the face of Washington’s official isolationist policies, he responded by rapidly developing political and ideological ties with a diverse range of forces both within the United States and throughout the rest of the world.
After the United States forced restrictions on Cuba’s rights within the framework of the Organization of American States, the Tricontinental Conferences were held in Havana, and the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was founded. In other words, the greater the attempts to isolate us, the more Cuba’s foreign relations expanded. (García, 2024)
The so-called First and Second Havana Declarations, issued on September 2, 1960, and February 4, 1962, respectively—both in direct response to the United States’ increasing hostility toward the island—were of particular significance for various reasons. What was unique about these events?
First, we are talking about massive rallies, each drawing more than one million Cubans, at a time when the island’s population was between five and six million. In other words, these were unprecedented exercises in communication (yes, in both directions) in which the leader of the Cuban Revolution not only explained his arguments but also sought popular support—which he received in the form of cheers, frequent responses, and prolonged applause.
They were milestones in the history of mass communication, long before today’s digital platforms existed.
These events indicate that Fidel had a clear and early understanding of how essential the people’s support and participation in foreign policy were. It was crucial that each and every Cuban embrace the principles guiding the response to the United States and feel part of the political message, which undoubtedly gave greater impact to what was said before the American audience. (Castro, 2014)
The other major contribution of both events is that, during their course, principles and ideas were articulated that constituted an essential part of Cuba’s official position toward the United States in the subsequent years—ranging from the demand for an end to aggression to the return of the territory illegally occupied at the Guantánamo Naval Base. These were not priorities approved by bureaucrats, officials, or ideological vanguards; rather, they represented the construction of a Cuban position on the international stage based practically on the results of referendums.
The second of these mass exercises took place after the successful conclusion of the Campaign Against Illiteracy in Cuba, which served to truly integrate into the country’s political life the 60 percent of citizens who had no formal education in 1959. In this way, Fidel viewed an educated people with strong values as the Revolution’s best ambassadors and, at the same time, forged an indestructible link between the country’s domestic and foreign policies. Apart from contributing to the formation of a professional and revolutionary diplomatic corps, the premise was that the country’s principal representatives would be its finest scientists, its most prominent athletes, its most distinguished intellectuals, and above all, its vibrant youth forging a path toward the future.
In his memorable speech before the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960, Fidel drew a parallel between the problems faced by the Cuban people at that time and those existing in the underdeveloped world of the moment, when he explained the text of the first Havana Declaration to the plenary. (Sánchez Parodi, 2025)
It was his way of saying that, if national imbalances were resolved in each country, this could have a global impact and perhaps open new paths for humanity. Fidel referred to:
“The right of peasants to land; the right of workers to the fruits of their labor; the right of children to education; the right of the sick to medical and hospital care; the right of young people to work; the right of students to free, experimental, and scientific education; the right of Black people and Indigenous peoples to the ‘full dignity of man’; the right of women to civil, social, and political equality; the right of the elderly to a secure old age; the right of intellectuals, artists, and scientists to strive, through their work, for a better world; the right of states to nationalize imperialist monopolies, thereby reclaiming national wealth and resources; the right of countries to free trade with all the peoples of the world; the right of nations to full sovereignty; the right of peoples to convert their military fortresses into schools and to arm their workers.” (Castro, 1960)
His commitment to truth and transparency even led him to engage in intense discussions with Soviet leaders at the time regarding the need to make public the plans to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba for defensive purposes toward the end of 1962. Perhaps the course of the so-called October Crisis would have been different if Cuban and Soviet intentions had been made public from the outset. (Ramírez, 2017)
Despite the fierce confrontation coming from the United States, Fidel did not shut himself off from communication with Washington. He gathered information and conveyed messages from a variety of sources and through a diversity of channels. And this would be a trait that would accompany him throughout his life: he never formed an opinion about an event based on a single piece of information, obtained through a single channel, whether Cuban or foreign.
Like few others, he understood the complexity of the U.S. political system, the diversity of actors, the temporary alliances formed based on short-term interests, and how these alliances transform and give rise to new opportunities—or risks.
After ensuring a multifaceted understanding of each phenomenon, he examined the causality of events over and over again, placing the beginning at the end—and vice versa. He always contrasted the event itself with its historical context and projected it into the future, time and again.
As the worst years of U.S. military confrontation with Cuba passed and the island expanded its international ties, doors opened within U.S. society that Fidel Castro navigated masterfully. (Sánchez Parodi, 2025)
For this and other reasons, it can be said that when the first steps toward a bilateral rapprochement began to be taken during the presidencies of Gerald Ford and James Carter—culminating, among other things, in the opening of Interests Sections in the respective capitals— the Cuban representatives, led personally by Fidel, were in a far better position than their counterparts to make proposals and envision a constructive future, at least in the so-called technical areas of the relationship. (Ramírez, Morales; 2014)
In summary, it can be said that, with the patience of a goldsmith, Fidel gradually built—either directly or indirectly—a network of relationships within the United States that allowed him to engage in direct exchange and receive feedback from various sectors of that society.
His direct personal ties to figures such as Malcolm X, Muhammad Ali, Danny Glover, Angela Davis, and Reverend Lucius Walker gave him a unique perspective on the African American community, while also explaining to that community Cuba’s internationalist involvement in Africa—which began in 1960 in Algeria, continued through the political changes in Southwest Africa between 1975 and 1990, and persists to this day.
His personal connection to securing Angola’s independence, the liberation of Namibia, and the end of apartheid, as well as his personal relationships with Agostinho Neto, Sam Nujoma, and Nelson Mandela, not only elevated him to the ranks of the 20th century’s foremost political and military strategists but also made a profound contribution to the views that new generations of Americans formed about the Cuban leader. His 1973 visit to the liberated territories of South Vietnam should be viewed in a similar light—a conflict that had such a devastating impact on American youth.
Fidel had a personal message for every visitor to Havana, or for every counterpart during his trips to New York and Washington. He received information and arguments from each and every one, which he archived and compared with interest. He listened with equal patience to both the most inexperienced and the most experienced. And all this knowledge was channeled into his relations with the U.S. Congress. Fidel is possibly the foreign leader who had the most contact with U.S. federal representatives and senators, with Cuba being the country most frequently visited by them for several years, particularly after 1990. (Cabañas, 2021)
As part of the American people, he prioritized his relationships with young people, based on the firm belief that dialogue with youth guarantees future peace and stability. Two examples suffice here: his repeated presentations to students arriving in Havana as part of the Semester at Sea program, with whom he engaged in dialogue as equals, without time pressure and with in-depth discussions.
The other example was the start of the admission of American students to the so-called Latin American School of Medicine in Cuba beginning in 2000, a project in which hundreds of young people from low-income communities have enrolled free of charge, with the sole commitment to return to their hometowns to offer their services in those parts of the United States. These students and graduates bring with them not only the best of what they have learned from the Cuban medical school and its clinical practice, but also the experience of living among the Cuban people for many years. Thousands of other U.S. college students have sought their own experiences in Cuba—with or without institutional support—for more than 60 years.
A key aspect of his legacy as a leader of international stature is his understanding of—and his consistent action in response to—crises, whether bilateral or multilateral in nature. Two examples suffice.
On September 11, 2001, while the world was still trying to grasp the scope of what had happened at the Twin Towers in New York and at the Pentagon in Washington, Fidel informed U.S. authorities that Cuban airports were prepared to receive U.S. aircraft that were still in flight and in need of alternative landing sites. At that moment, what mattered was the safety of human lives, not technical or logistical considerations regarding the capacity of Cuban facilities to provide such a service or the risks to the country. (Oramas León, 2001)
When, in late August 2005, the devastating Hurricane Katrina struck the southern city of New Orleans, in the state of Louisiana, Fidel organized the Henry Reeve medical contingent—named in honor of a high-ranking U.S. officer who fought in the Cuban War of Independence against Spain—which was ready to depart and assist the victims of that tragedy, which claimed more than 1,800 lives and caused billions in damage. (Castro, 2005)
None of these offers received an adequate response from U.S. federal authorities.
However, at least in the case of New Orleans, that message of solidarity struck a deep chord and left a unique mark, which to some extent resurfaced when, during the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the founding of the City of Havana in November 2019, an official delegation from New Orleans was the only foreign delegation to sign a cooperation agreement with the Cuban city.
In terms of official bilateral relations with the United States, Fidel publicly articulated time and again a long-term strategic vision; he defined principles and priorities, which he adhered to at all times and which were precisely what made it possible to resume diplomatic relations beginning in July 2015. Those strategic objectives were never subordinated to the pressures of the moment or to short-term interests. Above all, he reached the conviction—and explained to the world—that Cuba would never negotiate any issue under pressure, a principle that today constitutes a constitutional tenet of the Republic.
In that regard, he focused on priorities and sought alternatives to reduce tension on key points of the bilateral agenda. Although Cuba has maintained and will continue to maintain its claim to the territory illegally occupied by the Guantanamo Naval Base, a series of measures have been taken over the years that have made it possible, on the one hand, to reduce the risk of an unwanted confrontation around the facility, while at the same time rendering it an enclave of little military value in the event of a direct attack on Cuba.
It has been well documented that it was Fidel Castro—and not the ten U.S. presidents he faced—who sent the most messages to the other side in an effort to achieve a bilateral relationship based on mutual respect. (Leogrande, Kornbluh, 2015).
Of particular significance in the development of bilateral relations were two political campaigns led by Fidel beginning in the late 1990s. The first of these was related to the abduction of the minor Elián González, who was the victim of relatives who organized an illegal departure to U.S. territory. The second had to do with the protection and safe return to their homeland of the so-called Five Cuban Heroes.
Elián was returned to Cuba in June 2000, seven months after his abduction, as a result not only of the negotiations between the two governments but also of a political campaign that had a direct impact within the United States, including among the Cuban-American community itself. The principle established by Fidel at that time—that “no force in the world is capable of separating a father from his son if they want to be together”—became a guiding principle for similar cases that arose in the future, whether originating on Cuban soil or on the U.S. side. (Lamrani, 2007)
The Cuban Five were arrested in late 1998, along with others who had decided to collaborate with U.S. authorities to fabricate a case of alleged espionage against U.S. government institutions. After a staged “trial” held in Miami—a part of the United States where it is impossible to imagine any measured approach toward Cuba—Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, René González, Antonio Guerrero, and Fernando González were sentenced to long prison terms that expired in late 2014, when they were returned to Cuba.
In this case as well, there were several rounds of official negotiations, driven by the United States’ interest in bringing back to its territory its own citizens and others detained in Cuba who had carried out assignments for U.S. federal agencies in violation of local law. However, a solidarity movement in support of their cause took root within U.S. society, which was a key factor in prompting the federal government to pay attention to the issue and to view a negotiated resolution as an indispensable prerequisite for advancing official relations with Cuba. (Cabañas, 2021)
In addition to personally leading the technical and legal work to appeal to the various levels of the U.S. legal system with the aim of having the charges dismissed, Fidel devoted a significant portion of his private and public time to explaining to third parties the groundlessness of the accusations brought against the Five Cuban Heroes, the violations of U.S. laws, and the political cost to the United States of that act of personal vengeance.
Since stepping down from all the executive and political functions he had held as leader of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel maintained a critical perspective on the entire process leading up to and following the announcements—made in late 2014 by Army General Raúl Castro and President Barack Obama—regarding the probable restoration of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States.
In 2016, the year of his death, as he offered his reflections on the significance of President Barack Obama’s visit to Cuba, he highlighted—as part of his legacy—the two extremes between which the island’s relationship with its powerful neighbor exists:
“Let no one be under the illusion that the people of this noble and self-sacrificing country will renounce the glory and rights—and the spiritual wealth—they have earned through the development of education, science, and culture,” and he added, “We do not need the empire to give us anything. Our efforts will be legal and peaceful, because that is our commitment to peace and brotherhood among all human beings living on this planet.” (Castro, 2016)
Conclusions:
Fidel Castro was the principal architect of Cuba’s official and unofficial policy toward the United States, from the very triumph of the Revolution until the moment he stepped down from his government duties. Even after that date, he maintained a critical perspective on both domestic U.S. issues and those related to bilateral relations.
In this role, Fidel combined his skills as a master political and military strategist with more executive and practical tasks, such as engaging with economic, religious, and intellectual leaders in that country, and was able to build a vast network of relationships that kept him informed not only about developments in the U.S. domestic landscape but also about bilateral and multilateral issues.
Drawing on a deep understanding of the U.S. political system, he devised unique approaches for engaging with federal, state, and local governments, as well as with society at large at various levels, thereby distinguishing official policy toward Cuba from the genuine sentiments of the majority of the U.S. population.
Regardless of changing circumstances, successive administrations, and the impact of international events, Fidel defined a principled policy toward the United States that remained consistent over time and which, in short, made it possible—at least temporarily during three U.S. administrations—for steps to be taken that could have led to a different kind of relationship with Cuba.
Fidel’s engagement with these issues was so extensive and his creativity so multifaceted that it can be said he laid the groundwork for addressing any future matter in the bilateral relationship—in a manner consistent with the Cuban government’s historical positions and in a way that safeguards the country’s aspirations for sovereignty and fair treatment.
Fidel brought diplomacy and international relations closer to the masses, not only as a phenomenon that contributed to the educational and ideological development of the people, but also because he made them indispensable protagonists in the major achievements of the Cuban Revolution on the world stage.
José R. Cabañas Rodríguez is Director of the International Policy Research Center (CIPI) in Havana, Cuba and former Cuban Ambassador to the US.
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[1] Published in the journal *Cuadernos de Nuestra América*, No. 018, January–March 2026, www.cna.cipi.cu