By José R. Cabañas Rodríguez on September 17, 2026, from Havana
On September 14, news broke that the government of Austria—the host country of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—had reportedly denied entry to its territory, under pressure from the United States, to Mr. Mahammad Eslami, Iran’s vice president and head of its nuclear agency, who was set to represent his country at the international organization’s annual General Conference.
Such an action, rather than a supposed success of Trump-style “blackmail diplomacy,” is a new political victory for Tehran, as it would mean that the official’s statements before the plenary session and his bilateral contacts could have been as forceful as they were dangerous to Washington’s objectives against the Persian nation.
It was precisely there, at the Austrian headquarters, that the United States’ diplomatic battle began in 2002, in an effort to rally the rest of the organization’s members to condemn Iran’s nascent civilian nuclear program.
The State Department tasked an allied foreign ministry with having its representative to the IAEA ignite the debate with the aim of securing a condemnation of Tehran and, from there, coordinating further actions that could have culminated in the United Nations Security Council—as had previously occurred with the campaign against Iraq, under the alleged pretext of “possession of weapons of mass destruction” .
In the midst of a debate focused on cooperation regarding nuclear issues and other matters, the ally—who was also an English speaker and had nothing more to contribute than the text dictated from his capital—interrupted the session with a speech that was extremely aggressive toward Iran, something unheard of in his country’s recent diplomatic practice.
The reaction of everyone present—except for the U.S. representative—was one of astonishment and even derision. The then-Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohammed el-Baradei, interrupted the “kamikaze” diplomat in disbelief and politely asked him to present his views at the end of the agenda, under other matters, since it had not been planned or agreed upon to address such issues in the plenary session.
That was merely the first salvo in a battle that would stretch over the next 24 years until today, in which the United States has sought to isolate Tehran and establish a significant precedent that would allow it to escalate its confrontation with the Islamic Revolution.
Just one year earlier, the United States had used the attack on the Twin Towers as an excuse to launch a so-called campaign against international terrorism—which, according to its media outlets, was exclusively of Islamic origin and confined solely to the Middle East.
But after the “regime change” operation in Iraq was concluded and U.S. troops had occupied every inch of the country, Washington’s representative (a low-ranking official was sent) had to admit before the IAEA Board of Governors, in 2002 itself, that they had found no traces of weapons of mass destruction, in the country that had been attacked at the cost of millions of its citizens’ lives.
This reality did not prevent George W. Bush’s diplomatic apparatus, led by a former four-star general, from continuing its crusade against Tehran, while turning a blind eye to Tel Aviv’s nuclear advances—a country that did not even recognize the IAEA’s oversight of the issue.
Just as the United States was stoking tensions against Iran in the international press and other forums, Iranian diplomacy developed clever initiatives to explain its nuclear program’s peaceful purposes. It sent its most distinguished politicians and eminent scientists to Vienna and other capitals to provide details on its energy goals, based on both oil and gas as well as nuclear power.
Amid this standoff, hysteria grew in Washington over the lack of damning evidence against what could have been its next target for a military strike. Consequently, the U.S. multilateral mission was instructed to take the initiative itself and move forward with a draft resolution that explicitly mentioned the potential military use of Iran’s nascent nuclear program.
Despite pressure from all the State Department representatives—from the numerous invitations to dinner or coffee extended to their counterparts to the ambushes in the elevators and hallways of the IAEA headquarters—that mix of U.S. fabrications failed to capture the interest of the majority.
In the multilateral sphere, when the United States fails to achieve its objectives by pressuring member countries, it often shifts its focus to the international leaders and officials of the organization in question. At that time, Washington had an additional advantage, as el-Baradei’s second-in-command was, in fact, a U.S. official.
Then, a call went out for a somewhat unusual “session”: the agency’s Secretariat summoned a group of countries considered “key” within the Board of Governors off the record for an informal meeting very early one Saturday morning at the agency’s offices. Cuba was among those in attendance.
The only item on the unwritten agenda was, initially, to try to pressure those present and, subsequently, to determine whether there was any future for the paragraph in the draft resolution concocted in Washington that explicitly referred to the “military use of Iran’s nuclear program.”
Within minutes, the U.S. failure became evident; the overwhelming majority of those gathered there rejected the American onslaught. Faced with this scenario, Mohammed el-Baradei politely addressed the representative of the aggressor, saying, “Call Bolton and explain to him what has happened here,” to which the defeated son of the United States replied, “You call him, because he won’t answer my calls anymore.”
This Bolton was John Robert, then Under Secretary of State for (supposed) arms control and international (in)security affairs, who had been at the very center of the previous campaign against Iraq, who drafted much of the proposal being implemented against Iran, and who, in 2002 itself, had spread the headline claiming that Cuba’s development in the field of biotechnology was aimed at biological warfare. He was so unlucky at the time that the refutation of his claim against Cuba came from none other than former President James Carter, who was visiting Havana at the time.
José R. Cabañas Rodríguez is Director of the International Policy Research Center (CIPI) in Havana, Cuba and former Cuban Ambassador to the US.
Source: Resumen Latinoamericano – English