By Alejandra Garcia Elizalde on November 6, 2026
“At this point, all that is left is for them is to sanction the sun for giving us one more day of resistance with every sunrise.” foto: Adalberto Roque
Although Donald Trump’s name was not on the ballot in the midterm elections, the vote was nevertheless a referendum on his administration, with voters expressing their desire for change. His failure to deliver on the promises he made during the 2024 presidential campaign had made this political shift increasingly predictable, particularly his pledge that the United States would not become embroiled in endless wars again. The war in Iran, the ongoing bombings of small vessels in Caribbean and Pacific waters, and the siege against Cuba are all evidence of the deception to which the US people have been subjected.
Although it managed to retain key positions, the results in Florida raised warning signs for one of the main strongholds of the U.S. right, particularly for those sectors that have made hardline policies toward Cuba one of their main political causes.
The Republican Party faced a complex political landscape. Although it managed to retain key positions, the results in Florida raised warning signs for one of the main strongholds of the U.S. right, particularly for those sectors that have made hardline policies toward Cuba one of their main political causes.
The Republicans’ narrower electoral margins across the state, alongside Democratic gains in predominantly Latino areas, point to an increasingly competitive landscape for those who have spent decades advocating tougher sanctions against Cuba. However, this electoral setback is not yet enough to predict a shift in Washington’s policy toward the island.
Florida’s political evolution is no minor issue for Cuba. Much of Washington’s strategy toward the island revolves around the interests of political and economic groups based in the state, where anti-Cuban sentiment and confrontational rhetoric toward Havana have historically wielded considerable influence.
Florida is one of the main arenas shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba. It is home to those who profit from turning the anti-Cuban industry of hate into a business. For decades, it served as a platform of influence for sectors advocating maximum-pressure policies against the Cuban government. Its electoral weight, the concentration of anti-Cuban organizations, and the presence of political representatives with particularly hostile positions toward Havana have helped turn the state into a decisive player in Washington’s decisions toward the island.
This influence is tied to the legacy of figures linked to terrorist operations against Cuba, such as Luis Posada Carriles and Orlando Bosch, representatives of a political tradition that found protection and support in the United States. For decades, Miami shaped the direction of U.S. policy toward the island, driven by hatred, anti-Cuban sentiment, and anti-communism. These elements permeated and shaped Trump’s strategy ahead of the midterm elections.
Florida’s importance is also rooted in its demographic makeup. Communities of Cuban, Venezuelan, Colombian, Nicaraguan, and Haitian origin account for more than a quarter of the state’s population, making it a battleground for political and media narratives surrounding Washington’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. Recent election results, however, suggest that Republican dominance is no longer as firmly established as it once was.
In 2022, Ron DeSantis and Marco Rubio secured victories by margins of between 16 and 19 percentage points. In 2024, Trump carried Florida by a 13-point margin. This time, however, Republicans secured only between 50 and 51 percent of the vote in the main statewide races, while Democrats garnered between 48 and 49 percent.
The Republican setback was also evident in congressional races. Cuban-American Republican representatives Mario Diaz-Balart, Carlos Gimenez, and Maria Elvira Salazar, all influential voices in Congress advocating military attacks, further economic hardship, and expanded sanctions against Cuba, won reelection, but by considerably narrower margins.
One of the closest races was Salazar’s, in which she received 50.2 percent of the vote against Democrat Eliott Rodríguez’s 49.8 percent in District 27, which includes much of Miami. The narrow margin prompted Democrats to request a recount. Meanwhile, Díaz-Balart secured 49.9 percent in District 26, compared with Nicole Lucklin’s 49.1 percent.
Beyond party affiliations, one of the key questions is what is happening within Latino communities, particularly among Cubans living in the United States. The election results suggest that confrontational policies toward Cuba may be losing some of the support they have historically enjoyed among sectors of the diaspora. Anti-Cuban policies driven by hatred no longer appear to enjoy the same level of sympathy within the Cuban-descent community.
A shift may be underway in the perceptions of those who, despite living outside the island, maintain family and emotional ties to it. Many Cubans living in the United States have relatives in Cuba: mothers, fathers, grandparents, and friends. They are directly aware of the economic hardships their loved ones are enduring, yet they face growing obstacles when trying to help them, visit them, or maintain those family ties.
This situation is compounded by the anti-immigration policies pursued by the Trump administration and increasingly restrictive conditions for people arriving in the United States from other countries, particularly Cubans, who for decades benefited from preferential immigration mechanisms.
The immigration privileges historically granted to Cubans began to undergo changes during Trump’s first term (2017–2021) and have been further curtailed under his current administration. This shift has also affected the expectations of those who emigrated or still have family members on the island.
In this context, Washington’s policies toward Cuba are no longer merely an ideological issue. For part of the Cuban-American community, they have taken on a family, economic, and social dimension. Nevertheless, it would be premature to interpret these results as the beginning of an immediate transformation in U.S. policy.
Developments must be closely monitored, without excessive optimism, while recognizing that the Republican Party and the groups advocating intervention in Cuba and calling for hunger and sanctions against the island did not secure an easy or guaranteed victory in Florida.
The electoral landscape has also reopened the debate over the limits of Washington’s maximum-pressure strategy and the possibility of a military escalation against Cuba. Since January, the United States has intensified its campaign of economic and energy strangulation against the island, deepening restrictions that have constrained its development for decades. Against this backdrop, threats and confrontational statements have fueled concerns about a possible expansion of the conflict.
However, a U.S. military intervention would not necessarily serve Washington’s strategic interests. A military attack just a few miles from U.S. territory is unlikely to be in Washington’s real interest, particularly following the governing party’s major defeat in the midterm elections.
Among the factors that could discourage such a decision are opposition among segments of the US public to becoming involved in another military confrontation, concerns over increased defense spending, and the economic, energy, and human costs of the war against Iran. Added to these considerations is Cuba’s capacity to defend its territorial integrity and respond to any potential aggression.
Washington’s difficulties in identifying potential figures who could lead a political transition in Cuba are also noteworthy. U.S. efforts to find interlocutors willing to promote a change of government highlight the limitations of this strategy.
They have made desperate attempts to identify someone who could replace the Cuban government, but they have failed. The CIA is making explicit appeals to recruit individuals willing to promote regime change in Cuba because even U.S. intelligence agencies have been unable to identify a potential successor.
The narrowing Republican margins in Florida represent a political setback for the sectors that have spent years using the state as a platform for pressure against Cuba. They also raise questions about these groups’ ability to continue presenting their positions as the majority view within the US-Cuban community.
However, the electoral weakening of their leading representatives does not necessarily mean that the White House will change its strategy. U.S. policy toward Cuba is driven by institutional, geopolitical, and economic interests that extend far beyond the outcome of a state election.
The political landscape will remain shaped by Washington’s economic and political pressure, while Cuba maintains its position of resistance to coercive measures. Even if no military confrontation takes place, this hostile policy will continue. Nothing is going to change in that regard, and they have made that clear.
In an angry move the day after the elections, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed new sanctions on Cuba, targeting individuals and entities in the electronics, manufacturing, maritime, and technology sectors. The U.S. government designated eight entities and two individuals and identified five vessels as blocked property. These measures, of course, have extraterritorial effects.
Florida has thus sent an important political signal: the sectors that have turned confrontation with Cuba into a political platform are facing an increasingly divided and competitive electorate. The question is whether this erosion of support will eventually translate into concrete policy changes or whether Washington will maintain its maximum-pressure strategy against the island.
At this point, all that is left is for them is to sanction the sun for giving us one more day of resistance with every sunrise.
Source: Resumen Latinoamericano – English